(This paper has since been republished in _Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Critical Essays_, edited by Patricia Kitcher [Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998], 21-44.) Kant's claim that space and time are "forms of intuition" is contrasted with the nativist claim that space is an innate idea or construct of the mind and with the empiricist claim that space is given in or learned from experience. It is argued that the nativism/empiricism debate masks a more fundamental disagreement between sensationism and constructivism. (...) Kant's account of space- and time-cognition is shown to be neither sensationist nor constructivist and as a consequence to be "nativistic" in a sense which commentators from Vaihinger and Kemp Smith to Patricia Kitcher have failed to capture. (shrink)