Healthcare whistle blowing, despite the benefits it has brought to healthcare systems in many developed countries, remains generally regarded as a pariah activity by many of the most influential healthcare professionals and regulatory institutions. Few if any medical schools or law department health law and bioethics classes, teach whistle blowing in a formal sense. Yet without exception, public inquiries initiated by healthcare whistle blowers have validated their central allegations and demonstrated that the whistle blowers themselves were sincere in their desire (...) to implement the fundamental virtues and principles of medical ethics, bioethics and public health law. In many jurisdictions, the law, this time remarkably in advance of professional opinion, has offered legislative protection for reasonable allegations of whistleblowers made in good faith and in the public interest concerning a substantial and imminent threat to public safety. One reason for this paradoxical position, explored here, is that healthcare whistle blowing lacks a firm virtue-based theoretical bioethical and jurisprudential foundation. The hypothesis discussed is that the lack of this bioethical and jurisprudential substrate has contributed to a situation where healthcare whistle blowing suffers in terms of institutional support due to its lack of academic legitimacy. This article commences the process of redressing this imbalance by attempting to lay the theoretical foundations for healthcare whistle blowing. As a case study, this article concludes by discussing the Personal and Professional Development course at the ANU Medical School where healthcare whistle blowing is a formal part of a virtue-based curriculum that emphasises the foundational importance of conscience. Illustrative elements of that program are discussed. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper we argue that the standard focus on problems of informed consent in debates about the ethics of human experimentation is inadequate because it fails to capture a more fundamental way in which such experiments may be wrong. Taking clinical trials as our case in point, we suggest that it is the moral offence of using people as mere means which better characterizes what is wrong with violations of personal autonomy in certain kinds of clinical trials. This (...) account also helps bring out another important way in which the autonomy of the participants in clinical trials my be violated, even in cases where they have given informed consent to their involvement. Where relevant information about the trial is framed in such a way as to induce a patient's participation by appeal to their nonrational preferences, this is also a violation of their autonomy, and one which is distinct from a failure of informed consent. The underlying wrongness of both kinds of violations, we argue, is plausibly captured by the moral offence of using people as mere means. (shrink)