This article attempts to develop a rational reconstruction of Kuhn's epistemological relativism which effectively defends it against an influential line of criticism in the work of Shapere and Scheffler. Against the latter's reading of Kuhn, it is argued (1) that it is the incommensurability of scientific problems, data, and standards, not that of scientific meanings which primarily grounds the relativism argument; and (2) that Kuhnian incommensurability is compatible with far greater epistemological continuity from one theory to another than is implied (...) by the criticisms in question. The reconstruction of Kuhn is then used to show that while it constitutes a provocative form of relativism, it can also plausibly account for the sense in which scientific development is rational, involves standards external to particular paradigms, and exhibits progress of a sort. Finally, the article attempts to develop an adequate critical perspective on Kuhn's relativism by distinguishing a ?short?run? from a ?long?run? relativism, and a relativism concerning scientific knowledge from one concerning scientific rationality in Kuhn; the challenge each poses to positi?vist philosophy of science is distinguished and separately evaluated. (shrink)

Most sociologists of science have accepted R. K. Merton's view that there is no intrinsic connection between the ideas scientists hold and the way they behave. Merton based his approach on an extended analogy between science and economics. He assumed a division between the scientific "product" governed by an inflexible a-social logic and the processes of scientiftc "production" propelled by "non-logical" social behavior. Kuhn rejects this "divorce of convenience" and argues that "local" traditions which resist rationalization characterize both the theory (...) and practice of science. Politics, law, and religion provide more apt analogies for scientift activity than economics. However, Kuhn's attempt to replace epistemology with sociology in order to retain the notion of progressiveness in science blunts his contribution. His sociological approach would be most fruitful if he adopted "epistemological agnosticism.". (shrink)