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  1. Can the Best-Alternative Justification Solve Hume’s Problem? On the Limits of a Promising Approach.Eckhart Arnold - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (4):584-593.
    In a recent Philosophy of Science article Gerhard Schurz proposes meta-inductivistic prediction strategies as a new approach to Hume's. This comment examines the limitations of Schurz's approach. It can be proven that the meta-inductivist approach does not work any more if the meta-inductivists have to face an infinite number of alternative predictors. With his limitation it remains doubtful whether the meta-inductivist can provide a full solution to the problem of induction.
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  • The Meta‐inductivist’s Winning Strategy in the Prediction Game: A New Approach to Hume’s Problem.Gerhard Schurz - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (3):278-305.
    This article suggests a ‘best alternative' justification of induction (in the sense of Reichenbach) which is based on meta-induction . The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods which are accessible to her. It is demonstrated, and illustrated by computer simulations, that there exist meta-inductivistic prediction strategies whose success is approximately optimal among all accessible prediction methods in arbitrary possible worlds, and which dominate the success of every noninductive prediction strategy. The proposed justification of meta-induction is (...)
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  • The Lack of A Priori Distinctions Between Learning Algorithms.David H. Wolpert - 1996 - Neural Computation 8 (7):1341–1390.
    This is the first of two papers that use off-training set (OTS) error to investigate the assumption-free relationship between learning algorithms. This first paper discusses the senses in which there are no a priori distinctions between learning algorithms. (The second paper discusses the senses in which there are such distinctions.) In this first paper it is shown, loosely speaking, that for any two algorithms A and B, there are “as many” targets (or priors over targets) for which A has lower (...)
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  • No Free Lunch Theorem, Inductive Skepticism, and the Optimality of Meta-induction.Gerhard Schurz - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (5):825-839.
    The no free lunch theorem is a radicalized version of Hume’s induction skepticism. It asserts that relative to a uniform probability distribution over all possible worlds, all computable prediction algorithms—whether ‘clever’ inductive or ‘stupid’ guessing methods —have the same expected predictive success. This theorem seems to be in conflict with results about meta-induction. According to these results, certain meta-inductive prediction strategies may dominate other methods in their predictive success. In this article this conflict is analyzed and dissolved, by means of (...)
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  • The Revenge of Ecological Rationality: Strategy-Selection by Meta-Induction Within Changing Environments.Gerhard Schurz & Paul D. Thorn - 2016 - Minds and Machines 26 (1-2):31-59.
    According to the paradigm of adaptive rationality, successful inference and prediction methods tend to be local and frugal. As a complement to work within this paradigm, we investigate the problem of selecting an optimal combination of prediction methods from a given toolbox of such local methods, in the context of changing environments. These selection methods are called meta-inductive strategies, if they are based on the success-records of the toolbox-methods. No absolutely optimal MI strategy exists—a fact that we call the “revenge (...)
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  • The Metainductive Justification of Induction: The Pool of Strategies.Tom F. Sterkenburg - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (5):981-992.
    This article poses a challenge to Schurz’s proposed metainductive justification of induction. It is argued that Schurz’s argument requires a notion of optimality that can deal with an expanding pool of prediction strategies.
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  • The Logic of Reliable Inquiry.Kevin Kelly - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):351-354.
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  • A query on confirmation.Nelson Goodman - 1946 - Journal of Philosophy 43 (14):383-385.
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