Emotions are viewed as having evolved through their adaptive value in dealing with fundamental life-tasks. Each emotion has unique features: signal, physiology, and antecedent events. Each emotion also has characteristics in common with other emotions: rapid onset, short duration, unbidden occurrence, automatic appraisal, and coherence among responses. These shared and unique characteristics are the product of our evolution, and distinguish emotions from other affective phenomena.

Two thing are obvious from the subjective experience of emotional states: (1) emotions have a power of their own in directing and disrupting behavioural options, thinking processes, and bodily states, all the more so if one is immature; (2) our thoughts and appraisals of events can instigate or inhibit feelings to a substantial extent, all the more so as we age and get more experienced. These common introspective observations suggest that there are reciprocal influences between emotions and cognitive processes, the (...) strength of which change as a function of developmental stages. Alternatively, these observations, especially the latter, could suggest that emotions and cognitive processes are orthogonal reflections of the same brain systems. In the preceding article, Gray advocates the siren-song attractions of the latter view-a delusional view, at least for psychobiologists, I would argue. In this commentary (invited by the editor of this special issue of Cognition and Emotion), I will reaffirm the utility of emotiodcognition distinctions in behavioural brain research, and attempt to coax Gray back to a more traditional view from which he now seems to have departed. Although Gray covers many issues with which I agree, in typical hominid fashion I will bluntly proceed to focus more on those matters with which I disagree. I thank the editor for requesting me to share this alternative view. Literature citations are used sparingly, but much of the relevant material can be accessed from the cited reviews from our laboratory. (shrink)

Reviews evidence which suggests that there may be little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes. Ss are sometimes unaware of the existence of a stimulus that importantly influenced a response, unaware of the existence of the response, and unaware that the stimulus has affected the response. It is proposed that when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, that is, on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do (...) so on the basis of any true introspection. Instead, their reports are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or judgments about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response. This suggests that though people may not be able to observe directly their cognitive processes, they will sometimes be able to report accurately about them. Accurate reports will occur when influential stimuli are salient and are plausible causes of the responses they produce, and will not occur when stimuli are not salient or are not plausible causes. (shrink)

Computing Methodologies -- Artificial Intelligence.

What are 'emotions'? This book offers a balanced survey of facts and theory.