The object of this paper is twofold: to show that resistance to scientific change on the part of scientists need signal neither irrationality nor the presence of extra-scientific influences; and to show how such resistance can be accommodated within a theory of rational choice. After considerations have been outlined suggesting that scientists cannot rationally resist new scientific theories unless theory choice is subjectivistic (section I), evidence is adduced favoring the contrary view (section II). In section III, a non-subjectivistic, non-relativistic conception (...) of rational choice is proposed which recognizes the possibility of scientists' rationally resisting new scientific developments. Finally, in section IV, some minor misunderstandings concerning resistance are discussed. (shrink)

The problem of the critical assessment of theories across paradigms raised by Kuhn is not resolved, it is argued, either by Scheffler's appeal to initial credibility or by Lakatos' conception of a research program. It is argued further that, in these contexts, the notion of reasonable choice by individuals makes no sense. The conclusion supports Feyerabend's position of "epistemological anarchism.".

Recent work in the philosophy of science has taken a decidedly historicist turn. A number of writers have rejected the traditional thesis that science develops through the accumulation of firmly established truths, maintaining instead that scientific research is founded on beliefs which are presupposed without having been proven. Since these presuppositions are not established truths they are subject to revision, and a change in the presuppositions of a discipline results in a fundamental restructuring of that discipline, i.e., a scientific revolution. (...) There are a number of versions of this general approach currently under debate, and there is considerable disagreement on how the various versions are to be interpreted. The central issue of this debate is the nature of scientific revolutions and it will be useful for our purposes to establish a point of reference by sketching an extreme view of scientific revolutions, a view which is often attributed to Kuhn and Feyerabend. (shrink)