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  1. Reference and definite descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
    Definite descriptions, I shall argue, have two possible functions. 1] They are used to refer to what a speaker wishes to talk about, but they are also used quite differently. Moreover, a definite description occurring in one and the same sentence may, on different occasions of its use, function in either way. The failure to deal with this duality of function obscures the genuine referring use of definite descriptions. The best known theories of definite descriptions, those of Russell and Strawson, (...)
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  • On Testing for Conversational Implicature.Jerrold M. Sadock - 1978 - In Peter Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics: Pragmatics. Academic Press. pp. 281–297.
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  • (1 other version)Donnellan's distinction/Kripke's test.M. Reimer - 1998 - Analysis 58 (2):89-100.
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  • Pluralities.Roger Schwarzschild - 1996 - Springer.
    Precursors. 2.1 Introduction Thus far I have presented an approach to the semantics of plurals in the form of two rather similar grammars for a fragment of English. And I have given a few examples of the kinds of things one can say within this ...
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  • The case for referential descriptions.Michael Devitt - 2004 - In Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and beyond. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 234--260.
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  • (2 other versions)Descriptions.S. Neale - 1996 - Critica 28 (83):97-129.
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  • Philosophy without ambiguity: a logico-linguistic essay.Jay David Atlas - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    This book expounds and defends a new conception of the relation between truth and meaning. Atlas argues that the sense of a sense-general sentence radically underdetermines its truth-conditional content. He applies this linguistic analysis to illuminate old and new philosophical problems of meaning, truth, falsity, negation, existence, presupposition, and implicature. In particular, he demonstrates how the concept of ambiguity has been misused and confused with other concepts of meaning, and how the interface between semantics and pragmatics has been misunderstood. The (...)
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