This review considers a number of recent theories on the neural basis of consciousness, with particular attention to the theories of Bogen, Crick, Llinás, Newman, and Changeux. These theories allot different roles to various key brain areas, in particular the reticular and intralaminar nuclei of the thalamus and the cortex. Crick's hypothesis is that awareness is a function of reverberating corticothalamic loops and that the spotlight ofintramodalattention is controlled by the reticular nucleus of the thalamus. He also proposed different mechanisms (...) for attention and intention . The current review presents a new hypothesis, based on elements from these hypotheses, includingintermodalattention and olfaction and pain, which may pose problems for Crick's original theory. This work reviews the possible role in awareness and intermodal attention and intention of the cholinergic system in the basal forebrain and the tegmentum; the reticular, the intralaminar, and the dorsomedial thalamic nuclei; the raphe and locus coeruleus; the reticular formation; the ventral striatum and extended amygdala; insula cortex, and other selected cortical areas. Both clinical and basic research data are covered. The conclusion is reached that the brain may work by largely nonlinear parallel processing and much intramodal shifts of attention may be effected by intracortical, or multiple corticothalamic mechanisms . But this is constrained by the functional anatomy of the circuits concerned and waking “awareness” is modulated by the many “nonspecific” systems . But the principal agents for intermodal attention shifts, the “searchlight,” may be two key nuclei of the cholinergic system in the mesencephalon. Clinical loss of consciousness results from damage to these nuclei but not from damage to the cholinergic nucleus basalis of the basal forebrain. (shrink)

A tacit assumption since the 19th Century has been that the neocortex serves as the "seat of consciousness." An unexpected challenge to that assumption arose in 1949 with the discovery that high-frequency EEG activation associated with an alert state requires the intactness of the brainstem reticular formation. This discovery became the impetus for nearly three decades of research on what came to be known as the reticular activating system. By the 1970s, however, methodological and philosophical controversies led to general abandonment (...) of subcortical theories of attention and consciousness, with a return to an almost exclusive focus upon the cortex. With recent advances in the neurosciences the focus is shifting once more, this time to the unique contributions of cortical, thalmic, and brainstem structures in mediating selective attention and perceptual awareness. This paper offers a nontechnical review of the history of these developments up to contemporary interest in the putative role of oscillatory EEG patterns in the integration of perceptual features of experience. It puts forward the thesis that a key to understanding attention and consciousness is an appreciation of contributions of the thalmus to these cognitive processes. (shrink)

Abstract“Sign stimuli” elicit specific patterns of behavior when an organism's motivation is appropriate. In the toad, visually released prey-catching involves orienting toward the prey, approaching, fixating, and snapping. For these action patterns to be selected and released, the prey must be recognized and localized in space. Toads discriminate prey from nonprey by certain spatiotemporal stimulus features. The stimulus-response relations are mediated by innate releasing mechanisms (RMs) with recognition properties partly modifiable by experience. Striato-pretecto-tectal connectivity determines the RM's recognition and localization (...) properties, whereas medialpallio-thalamo-tectal circuitry makes the system sensitive to changes in internal state and to prior history of exposure to stimuli. RMs encode the diverse stimulus conditions referring to the same prey object through different combinations of “specialized” tectal neurons, involving cells selectively tuned to prey features. The prey-selective neurons express the outcome of information processing in functional units consisting of interconnected cells. Excitatory and inhibitory interactions among feature-sensitive tectal and pretectal neurons specify the perceptual operations involved in distinguishing the prey from its background, selecting its features, and discriminating it from predators. Other connections indicate stimulus location. The results of these analyses are transmitted by specialized neurons projecting from the tectum to bulbar/spinal motor systems, providing a sensorimotor interface. Specific combinations of such projective neurons – mediating feature- and space-related messages – form “command releasing systems” that activate corresponding motor pattern generators for appropriate prey-catching action patterns. (shrink)

Cognitive functions like perception, memory, language, or consciousness are based on highly parallel and distributed information processing by the brain. One of the major unresolved questions is how information can be integrated and how coherent representational states can be established in the distributed neuronal systems subserving these functions. It has been suggested that this so-called ''binding problem'' may be solved in the temporal domain. The hypothesis is that synchronization of neuronal discharges can serve for the integration of distributed neurons into (...) cell assemblies and that this process may underlie the selection of perceptually and behaviorally relevant information. As we intend to show here, this temporal binding hypothesis has implications for the search of the neural correlate of consciousness. We review experimental results, mainly obtained in the visual system, which support the notion of temporal binding. In particular, we discuss recent experiments on the neural mechanisms of binocular rivalry which suggest that appropriate synchronization among cortical neurons may be one of the necessary conditions for the buildup of perceptual states and awareness of sensory stimuli. (shrink)