ABSTRACT This article defends the following argument: what makes you and I valuable so that it is wrong to kill us now is what we are (essentially). But we are essentially physical organisms, who, embryology reveals, came to be at conception/fertilisation. I reply to the objection to this argument (as found in Dean Stretton, Judith Thomson, and Jeffrey Reiman), which holds that we came to be at one time, but became valuable as a subject of rights only some time later, (...) in virtue of an acquired characteristic. I argue against this position that the difference between a basic, natural capacity and some degree of development of such a capacity is a mere difference in degree, that this position logically implies the denial of equal personal dignity, and that the selection of the required degree of development of a capacity is necessarily arbitrary. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to describe the scientific background to the current ethical and legislative debates about the generation and use of human stem cells, and to give an overview of the ethical issues underlying these debates. The ethical issues discussed are 1) stem cells and the status of the embryo, 2) women as the sources of ova for stem cell production, 3) the use of ova from other species, 4) slippery slopes towards reproductive cloning, 5) the public (...) presentation of stem cell research and 6) the evaluation of scientific uncertainty and its implications for public policy. (shrink)

Abortion is considered in relation to the doctrine of the double effect, which distinguishes between the intentions behind an action and consequences foreseen but not desired. This doctrine, often used to defend the position of the Catholic Church on abortion, is here rejected. Alternative distinctions are drawn, between what we do and what we allow to happen, and between the infringement of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ duties. These distinctions are applied to the problem of abortion and to other moral dilemmas.