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  1. (2 other versions)On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Availability: The cognitive basis of experience?David J. Chalmers - 2001 - In Mark Rowlands (ed.), The Nature of Consciousness. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 148-149.
    [[This was written as a commentary on Ned Block 's paper "On A Confusion about a Function of Consciousness" . It appeared in _Behavioral_ _and Brain Sciences_ 20:148-9, 1997, and also in the collection _The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates_ edited by Block, Flanagan, and Guzeldere. ]].
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  • Fallacies or analyses?Jennifer Church - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):251--2.
    To demonstrate that a fallacy is committed, Block needs to convince us of two things: first, that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is distinct from that of access consciousness, and second, that it picks out a different property from that of access consciousness. I raise doubt about both of these claims, suggesting that the concept of a phenomenal property is the concept of a property to which we have a special sort of access.
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  • (2 other versions)Availability: The cognitive basis of experience.David J. Chalmers - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):148-149.
    Although A-consciousness and P-consciousness are conceptually distinct, a refined notion of A-consciousness makes it plausible that the two are empirically inseparable. I suggest that the notion of direct availability for global control can play a central role here, and draw out some consequences.
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