In June 2008 the UK government, supported by the Royal College of Nursing, stated that nursing care would be measured for compassion. This paper considers the implications of this statement by critically examining the relationship of compassion to care from a variety of perspectives. It is argued that the current market-driven approaches to healthcare involve redefining care as a pale imitation, even parody, of the traditional approach of the nurse as “my brother’s keeper”. Attempts to measure such parody can only (...) measure artificial techniques and give rise to a McDonald’s-type nursing care rather than heartfelt care. The arguments of this paper, although applied to nursing, also apply to medicine and healthcare generally. (shrink)

Socrates (in the Meno) denied that virtues like courage could be taught, whereas Protagoras defended this claim. Compassion is discussed below in this context; it is distinguished from related, but different, moral qualities, and the role of imagination is emphasised. 'Sympathy's and role-modelling views of compassion's acquisition are criticised. Compassion can indeed be taught, but neither by the example of a few, isolated physicians nor by creation of Departments of Compassion. In replying to one standard objection to teaching compassion, it (...) is emphasised that scientific competence and compassion aren't mutually exclusive. (shrink)

Empathy is commonly regarded as an essential attribute for doctors and there is a conviction that empathy must be taught to medical students. Yet it is not clear exactly what empathy is, from a philosophical or sociological point of view, or whether it can be taught. The meaning, role and relevance of empathy in medical education have tended to be unquestioningly assumed; there is a need to examine and contextualise these assumptions. This paper opens up that debate, arguing that ‘empathy’, (...) as it is commonly understood, is neither necessary nor sufficient to guarantee good medical or ethical practice. (shrink)

The idea that ethics is a matter of personal feeling is a dogma widespread among medical students. Because emotivism is firmly rooted in contemporary culture, the authors think that focusing on personal feeling can be an important point of departure for moral education. In this contribution, they clarify how personal feelings can be a solid basis for moral education by focusing on the analysis of compassion by the French phenomenologist Emmanuel Housset. This leads to three important issues regarding ethics education: (...) the necessity of a continuous attention for and interpretation of the meaning of language, the importance of examining what aspect of “the other” touches one and what it is that evokes the urge to act morally and the need to relate oneself to the community, both to the medical community and to collectively formulated rules and laws. These issues can have a place in medical education by means of an ethical portfolio that supports students in their moral development. First, keeping a portfolio will improve their expression of the moral dimension of medical practice. Second, the effects of self-knowledge and language mastery will limit the pitfalls of emotivism and ethical subjectivism and will stimulate the inclination to really encounter the other. Third, it will show medical students from the start that their moral responsibility is more than following rules and that they are involved personally. (shrink)