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  1. Caring for Patients or Organs: New Therapies Raise New Dilemmas in the Emergency Department.Michael A. DeVita, Lisa S. Parker & Arjun Prabhu - 2017 - American Journal of Bioethics 17 (5):6-16.
    Two potentially lifesaving protocols, emergency preservation and resuscitation and uncontrolled donation after circulatory determination of death, currently implemented in some U.S. emergency departments, have similar eligibility criteria and initial technical procedures, but critically different goals. Both follow unsuccessful cardiopulmonary resuscitation and induce hypothermia to “buy time”: one in trauma patients suffering cardiac arrest, to enable surgical repair, and the other in patients who unexpectedly die in the ED, to enable organ donation. This article argues that to fulfill patient-focused fiduciary obligations (...)
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  • The Dead Donor Rule: Should We Stretch It, Bend It, or Abandon It?Robert M. Arnold & Stuart J. Youngner - 1993 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 3 (2):263-278.
    The dead donor rule—that persons must be dead before their organs are taken—is a central part of the moral framework underlying organ procurement. Efforts to increase the pool of transplantable organs have been forced either to redefine death (e.g., anencephaly) or take advantage of ambiguities in the current definition of death (e.g., the Pittsburgh protocol). Society's growing acceptance of circumstances in which health care professionals can hasten a patient's death also may weaken the symbolic importance of the dead donor rule. (...)
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  • The reversibility of death.D. J. Cole - 1992 - Journal of Medical Ethics 18 (1):26-33.
    The ordinary concept of death is analysed and compared with revisionary medical definitions, especially those based on irreversible loss of brain function. Prior critics of revisionary definitions have focused on the locus, the brain; I am concerned with the irreversibility condition. I argue that 1) the irreversibility condition is ambiguous, 2) it has unacceptable epistemic and other consequences on any plausible construal, and 3) irreversibility is not part of the ordinary concept of death. I conclude that recent medical definitions seek (...)
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