Like many environmental philosophers, I find the idea that the beauty of wildernesses makes them valuable in their own right and gives us a moral duty to preserve and protect them to be attractive. However, this appeal to aesthetic value encounters a number of serious problems. I argue that these problems can best be met and overcome by recognizing that the appreciation of natural environments and the appreciation of great works of arts are activities more similar than many people have (...) supposed. (shrink)

In recent decades, designers, architects, and landscape architects concerned with their contribution to today’s ecological problems started formulating a new way of designing and creating artifacts. Called “ecological design” and promoted as a corrective alternative to conventional practice, its basic tenet is to draw from nature a guidance for design, rather than imposing our design on nature. This newapproach signifies a welcome change, first by calling attention to the ecological implications of artifacts, a subject matter generally neglected in environmental ethics, (...) and, second, by providing useful, specific suggestions regarding the ecologically responsible way of designing artifacts. However, the conceptual basis and resultant implications of ecological design deserve and need critical analyses. I argue that the basic premise of ecological design—that nature should act as the authority—is problematic by examining analogous strategies from social, political, moral, and aesthetic realms, as well as by exploring its specific application in the promotion of “native” plants in gardens. I end with another issue often neglected in the practice of ecological design: our aesthetic response to the created objects. (shrink)

In this paper I explore various grounds on which wilderness can be regarded as something which we should value, and I draw attention to the problems of resolving conftict which are generated by these diverse grounds. I conclude that our attitudes toward nature are partially determined by a background of metaphysical assumptions which derive in particular from the philosophy of Descartes. Thesemetaphysical preconceptions lead to the misconception that various alternative views about the natural environment are mystical or occult. Thus, an (...) alternative non-Cartesian mode ofconception involving holistic or systemic modes of-thought is required in order to develop a satisfactory basis for our attitude toward the natural world. (shrink)

Positive aesthetics holds that the natural environment, insofar as it is unaffected by man, has only positive aesthetic qualities and value-that virgin nature is essentially beautiful. In spite of the initial implausibility of this position, it is nonetheless suggested by many individuals who have given serious thought to the natural environment and to environmental philosophy. Certain attempts to defend theposition involve claiming either that it is not implausible because our appreciation of nature is not genuinely aesthetic, or that the position (...) is justified in virtue of man’s limited control and understanding of the natural world or in virtue of the natural world’s divine design and origin. Such attempts are inadequate; they neither justify the position nor explain its acceptance. In order to account for positive aesthetics,we must note the intimate connection between nature appreciation and the development of natural science. An understanding of the role of scientific knowledge in the aesthetic appreciation of nature not only sheds light on the acceptance of the positive aesthetics position, but also suggests a means by which to justify it. (shrink)