1 Meaning and Truth Objection to propositions Propositions as information Diffuseness of empirical meaning Propositions dismissed Truth and semantic ascent Tokens and eternal sentences 2 Grammar Grammar by recursion Categories Immanence and transcendence Grammarian's goal reexamined Logical grammar Redundant devices Names and functors Lexicon, particle, and name Criterion of lexicon Time, events, adverbs Attitudes and modality 3 Truth Truth and satisfaction Satisfaction by sequences Tarski's definition of truth Paradox in the object language Resolution in set theory 4 Logical Truth In (...) terms of structure In terms of substitution In terms of models Adequacy of substituteon In terms of proof In terms of grammar 5 The Scope of Logic Affinities of identity Identity reduced Set theory Set theory in sheep's clothing Logic in wolf's clothing Scope of the virtual theory Simulated class quantification Other simulated quantification Annexes 6 Deviant Login Change of logic, change of subject Logic in translation Law of excluded middle Debate about the dichotomy Intuitionism Branched quantifiers Substitutional quantification Its strength 7 The Ground of Logical Truth The semblance of a theory An untenable dualism The place of logic For Further Reading Index. (shrink)

We discuss presupposition, the phenomenon whereby speakers mark linguistically the information that is presupposed or taken for granted, rather than being part of the main propositional content of a speech act. Expressions and constructions carrying presuppositions are called “presupposition triggers”, forming a large class including definites and factive verbs. The article first introduces the range of triggers, the basic properties of presuppositions such as projection and cancellability, and the diagnostic tests used to identify them. The reader is then introducedto major (...) models of presupposition from the last 50 years, separated into three classes: Frege-Strawson derived semantic models, pragmaticmodels such as that offered by Stalnaker, and dynamic models. Finallywe discuss some of the main current issues in presupposition theory. These involve accommodation, which occurs when a hearer's knowledge state is adjusted to meet the speaker's presuppositions; presupposition failure, which occurs when a presupposition is false; the interaction between presuppositions and attitudes; and the triggering problem, i.e., the problem of explaining why presuppositions occur in the first place. (shrink)

In moral and political philosophy, collective obligations are promising “gap-stoppers” when we find that we need to assert some obligation, but can not plausibly ascribe this obligation to individual agents. Most notably, Bill Wringe and Jesse Tomalty discuss whether the obligations that correspond to socio-economic human rights are held by states or even by humankind at large. The present paper aims to provide a missing piece for these discussions, namely an account of the conditions under which obligations can apply to (...) loose collections of agents that do not qualify as collective agents in their own right. I first explain the notion of joint obligations of loose collections of agents as opposed to collective obligations of collections of agents that are collective agents in their own right, and argue that the conditions under which agents can jointly have obligations are the conditions under which they are jointly able to do what is required. I then build on Virginia Held’s seminal work on the moral responsibility of “random collections” to develop such conditions for joint ability. My discussion shows that collections of individuals can more easily be subject to moral obligations than previously assumed. It also shows that putative joint obligations need to be carefully time-indexed, and that it is largely an empirical question whether a given collection can be subject to a moral obligation to perform a given joint action at a particular time. (shrink)