SummaryA dilemma concerning reference is posed: on the one hand it seems essential, if we are to give an account of truth, to first give an account of reference. On the other hand, reference is more remote than truth from the evidence in behavior on which a radical theory of language must depend, since words refer only in the context of sentences, and it is sentences which are needed to promote human purposes. The solution which is proposed is to treat (...) reference as a theoretical construct whose sole function is to serve a theory of truth. Since more than one relation between words and objects will serve a theory of truth equally well, this amounts to giving up the concept of reference as basic. (shrink)

SummaryA dilemma concerning reference is posed: on the one hand it seems essential, if we are to give an account of truth, to first give an account of reference. On the other hand, reference is more remote than truth from the evidence in behavior on which a radical theory of language must depend, since words refer only in the context of sentences, and it is sentences which are needed to promote human purposes. The solution which is proposed is to treat (...) reference as a theoretical construct whose sole function is to serve a theory of truth. Since more than one relation between words and objects will serve a theory of truth equally well, this amounts to giving up the concept of reference as basic. (shrink)

The question I hope to answer is brief: What does every speaker of a natural language know? My answer is briefer still: Nothing, or at least nothing interesting. Explaining the question, and making the answer plausible, is a longer job.

Hilary Putnam; X*—What Is “Realism”?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 76, Issue 1, 1 June 1976, Pages 177–194, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotel.

In the last year or two, the “causal theory” of proper names, first suggested by Saul Kripke in 1967, has received a lot of attention. This paper has two aims. First, to show that the causal theory offers the most plausible solution to a problem posed by the well-known fact that proper names typically have more than one bearer. Second, to consider the implications of this discussion, and of the causal theory, for semantics as a whole.