Switch to: Citations

References in:

Two ways to understand causality in agency

In A. Leist (ed.), Action in Context (2007)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Causation.D. Lewis - 1973 - In Philosophical Papers Ii. Oxford University Press. pp. 159-213.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   222 citations  
  • The Problem of Action.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (2):157-162.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   82 citations  
  • Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
    This essay challenges the widely accepted principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. The author considers situations in which there are sufficient conditions for a certain choice or action to be performed by someone, So that it is impossible for the person to choose or to do otherwise, But in which these conditions do not in any way bring it about that the person chooses or acts as he (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   624 citations  
  • Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision.David K. Lewis - 1980 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (3):239-249.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   96 citations  
  • Psychological Predicates.Hilary Putnam - 1967 - In W. H. Capitan & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 37--48.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   152 citations  
  • Essays on Actions and Events.Donald Davidson - 1980 - Ethics 93 (3):608-611.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   163 citations  
  • Dispositions.Stephen Mumford - 1998 - Mind 114 (453):178-180.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  • Causal Powers.E. H. Madden - 1975 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (2):268-269.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • Thinking About Mechanisms.Peter K. Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
    The concept of mechanism is analyzed in terms of entities and activities, organized such that they are productive of regular changes. Examples show how mechanisms work in neurobiology and molecular biology. Thinking in terms of mechanisms provides a new framework for addressing many traditional philosophical issues: causality, laws, explanation, reduction, and scientific change.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   899 citations  
  • Do We Cause Our Own Actions?Irving Thalberg - 1967 - Analysis 27 (6):196 - 201.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Internalising Practical Reasons.Rowland Stout - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):229–243.
    Practical reasons figure in both the justification and the causal explanation of action. It is usually assumed that the agent’s state of believing rather than what they believe must figure in the causal explanation of action. But, that the agent believes something is not a reason in the sense of being part of the justification of what they do. So it is often concluded that the justifying reason is a different sort of thing from the causally motivating reason. But this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Do Our Intentions Cause Our Intentional Actions?Irving Thalberg - 1984 - American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (3):249 - 260.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Because He Thought He Had Insulted Him.Adam Morton - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):5-15.
    I compare our idioms for quantifying into belief contexts to our idioms for quantifying into intention contexts. The latter is complicated by the fact that there is always a discrepancy between the action as intended and the action as performed. The article contains - this is written long after it appeared - an early version of a tracking or sensitivity analysis of the relation between a thought and its object.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Things That Happen Because They Should: A Teleological Approach to Action.Rowland Stout - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
    Rowland Stout presents a new philosophical account of human action which is radically and controversially different from all rival theories. He argues that intentional actions are unique among natural phenomena in that they happen because they should happen, and that they are to be explained in terms of objective facts rather than beliefs and intentions.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations