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Neuroscientific Kinds Through the Lens of Scientific Practice

In Catherine Kendig, Natural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice. Routledge. pp. 47-56 (2015)

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  1. Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for generalized causal inference.William R. Shadish - 2001 - Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Edited by Thomas D. Cook & Donald Thomas Campbell.
    Sections include: experiments and generalised causal inference; statistical conclusion validity and internal validity; construct validity and external validity; quasi-experimental designs that either lack a control group or lack pretest observations on the outcome; quasi-experimental designs that use both control groups and pretests; quasi-experiments: interrupted time-series designs; regresssion discontinuity designs; randomised experiments: rationale, designs, and conditions conducive to doing them; practical problems 1: ethics, participation recruitment and random assignment; practical problems 2: treatment implementation and attrition; generalised causal inference: a grounded theory; (...)
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  • Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches.Gualtiero Piccinini & Carl Craver - 2011 - Synthese 183 (3):283-311.
    We sketch a framework for building a unified science of cognition. This unification is achieved by showing how functional analyses of cognitive capacities can be integrated with the multilevel mechanistic explanations of neural systems. The core idea is that functional analyses are sketches of mechanisms , in which some structural aspects of a mechanistic explanation are omitted. Once the missing aspects are filled in, a functional analysis turns into a full-blown mechanistic explanation. By this process, functional analyses are seamlessly integrated (...)
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  • Construct validity in psychological tests.Lee J. Cronbach & P. E. Meehl - 1956 - In Herbert Feigl & Michael Scriven, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. , Vol. pp. 1--174.
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  • Reconsidering 'spatial memory' and the Morris water maze.Jacqueline Anne Sullivan - 2010 - Synthese 177 (2):261-283.
    The Morris water maze has been put forward in the philosophy of neuroscience as an example of an experimental arrangement that may be used to delineate the cognitive faculty of spatial memory (e.g., Craver and Darden, Theory and method in the neurosciences, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2001; Craver, Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). However, in the experimental and review literature on the water maze throughout the history of its use, (...)
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  • Consciousness as a scientific concept: a philosophy of science perspective.Elizabeth Irvine - 2012 - Springer.
    The source of endless speculation and public curiosity, our scientific quest for the origins of human consciousness has expanded along with the technical capabilities of science itself and remains one of the key topics able to fire public as much as academic interest. Yet many problematic issues, identified in this important new book, remain unresolved. Focusing on a series of methodological difficulties swirling around consciousness research, the contributors to this volume suggest that ‘consciousness’ is, in fact, not a wholly viable (...)
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  • Saving Subtraction: A reply to Van Orden and Paap.Adina L. Roskies - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):635-665.
    Van Orden and Paap argue that subtractive functional neuroimaging is fundamentally flawed, unfalsifiable, and cannot bear upon the nature of mind. In this they are mistaken, although their criticisms interestingly illuminate the scientific problems we confront in investigating the material basis of mind. Here, I consider the criticisms of Van Orden and Paap and discuss where they are mistaken and where justified. I then consider the picture of imaging science that Van Orden and Paap seem to espouse and sketch an (...)
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  • Searching for the Source of Executive Attention.Catherine Stinson - 2009 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 15 (1):137-154.
    William James presaged, and Alan Allport voiced criticisms of cause theories of executive attention for involving a homunculus who directs attention. I review discussions of this problem, and argue that existing philosophical denials of the problem depend on equivocations between different senses of “Cartesian error”. Another sort of denial tries to get around the problem by offering empirical evidence that such an executive attention director exists in prefrontal cortex. I argue that the evidence does not warrant the conclusion that an (...)
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