This new edition includes a substantial postscript by the author, in which he responds to thirty years of discussion, criticism and further work in the field to ...

Tthis book is likely to receive its warmest reception form advanced students of the philosophy of law, who will welcome the relief provided from the frequently sterile tone of much recent work in the field.

. The author aims at defining the borderlines of the concept “rule of law.” This has been often inflated to encompass several dimensions of an ideal legal order. The author on the contrary believes that the “rule of law” ought to be a “thin” ideal. As a matter of fact, when the “rule of law” signifies almost any dimension of an ideal legal order, it comes to stand for nothing essential in particular. Deflation is then advocated for the rehabilitation of (...) the normative content of the “rule of law.” This means that the “rule of law” should be defined as a concept covering only some well delimited dimensions of an ideal legal order. (shrink)

The author aims at defining the borderlines of the concept “rule of law.” This has been often inflated to encompass several dimensions of an ideal legal order. The author on the contrary believes that the “rule of law” ought to be a “thin” ideal. As a matter of fact, when the “rule of law” signifies almost any dimension of an ideal legal order, it comes to stand for nothing essential in particular. Deflation is then advocated for the rehabilitation of the (...) normative content of the “rule of law.” This means that the “rule of law” should be defined as a concept covering only some well delimited dimensions of an ideal legal order. (shrink)