Are inequalities of income created by the free market just? In this book Serena Olsaretti examines two main arguments that justify those inequalities: the first claims that they are just because they are deserved, and the second claims that they are just because they are what free individuals are entitled to. Both these arguments purport to show, in different ways, that giving responsible individuals their due requires that free market inequalities in incomes be allowed. Olsaretti argues, however, that neither argument (...) is successful, and shows that when we examine closely the principle of desert and the notions of liberty and choice invoked by defenders of the free market, it appears that a conception of justice that would accommodate these notions, far from supporting free market inequalities, calls for their elimination. Her book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in political philosophy, political theory and normative economics. (shrink)

In clinical research the giving of consent by the patient often lies within the context of illness or the doctor/patient relationship. On exploration of these issues it would appear unlikely that the patient's consent is free of substantial influences, some of which may be strong enough to be controlling. Five categories of consent are suggested: voluntary, involuntary, coerced, enforced and partially voluntary. It is argued that consent in clinical research is substantially influenced and thus only partially voluntary. Several practical strategies (...) are proposed to ensure adequately voluntary consent by reducing some circumstantial influences when consent to clinical research is obtained. (shrink)

Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is currently in pivotal trials as an intervention for treatment-resistant depression (TRD). Although offering hope for TRD, DBS also provokes ethical concerns—particularly about decision-making capacity of people with depression—among bioethicists, investigators, institutional review boards, and the public. Here, we examine this critical issue of informed consent for DBS research using available evidence regarding decision-making capacity and depression. Further, we explore the implications of the nature of TRD as well as that of the intervention (invasive brain surgery) (...) for informed consent. Based on these analyses, we argue that additional safeguards specific to DBS research for TRD, beyond those that might be used in any higher risk study, are not supported by available empirical evidence. We nevertheless underscore the limited data on such invasive procedures in severely ill psychiatric patients and advocate a research agenda for the systematic study of ethical issues raised by these research endeavors. (shrink)