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  1. Quantum logic and the projection postulate.Geoffrey Hellman - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (3):469-486.
    This paper explores the status of the von Neumann-Luders state transition rule (the "projection postulate") within "real-logic" quantum logic. The entire discussion proceeds from a reading of the Luders rule according to which, although idealized in applying only to "minimally disturbing" measurements, it nevertheless makes empirical claims and is not a purely mathematical theorem. An argument (due to Friedman and Putnam) is examined to the effect that QL has an explanatory advantage over Copenhagen and other interpretations which relativize truth-value assignments (...)
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  • Quantum Logic, Conditional Probability, and Interference.Michael Friedman & Hilary Putnam - 1978 - Dialectica 32 (3‐4):305-315.
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  • Quantum logic, conditional probability, and interference.Jeffrey Bub - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (3):402-421.
    Friedman and Putnam have argued (Friedman and Putnam 1978) that the quantum logical interpretation of quantum mechanics gives us an explanation of interference that the Copenhagen interpretation cannot supply without invoking an additional ad hoc principle, the projection postulate. I show that it is possible to define a notion of equivalence of experimental arrangements relative to a pure state φ , or (correspondingly) equivalence of Boolean subalgebras in the partial Boolean algebra of projection operators of a system, which plays a (...)
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  • Philosophical problems concerning the meaning of measurement in physics.Henry Margenau - 1958 - Philosophy of Science 25 (1):23-33.
    The trouble with the idea of measurement is its seeming clarity, its obviousness, its implicit claim to finality in any inquisotory discourse. Its status in philosophy of science is taken to be utterly primitive; hence the difficulties it embodies, if any, tend to escape detection and scrutiny. Yet it cannot be primitive in the sense of being exempt from analysis; for if it were every measurement would require to be simply accepted as a protocol of truth, and one should never (...)
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  • Quantum logic and the luders rule.Allen Stairs - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (3):422-436.
    In a recent paper, Michael Friedman and Hilary Putnam argued that the Luders rule is ad hoc from the point of view of the Copenhagen interpretation but that it receives a natural explanation within realist quantum logic as a probability conditionalization rule. Geoffrey Hellman maintains that quantum logic cannot give a non-circular explanation of the rule, while Jeffrey Bub argues that the rule is not ad hoc within the Copenhagen interpretation. As I see it, all four are wrong. Given that (...)
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