Jonathan Edwards, despite being considered one of the greatest American philosopher-theologians, has yet to grace the bioethics scene. In this essay, I contend that Edwards’ synthesis of Reformed theology and unique concept of beauty can provide a significant metaethics to Reformed theological ethics and contemporary bioethics. First, I explore Edwards’ notion of beauty and how its theocentrism integrates divine communication and creational typology in the context of redemptive history. Second, I develop a biblical framework for a covenantal, eschatological theology of (...) medicine, refracted through the lens of Edwardsian beauty, with Christ as archetypal physician and patient. Such a theology of medicine affirms the importance of desire in ethics over against a Kantian ethic of disinterested duty. Third, I end with a brief discussion of how such a framework can inform medical practice as moral formation and beautification. (shrink)

This article argues that Dr. Kornu has failed to demonstrate how Jonathan Edward’s theology of beauty can substantively contribute to a contemporary Christian theology of medicine. Edward’s appropriation of Neo-Platonic language is contrasted with the use of the same language by the Orthodox Church Fathers. It is argued that the absence of a mystical understanding of theology, sacramental church structure, and ascetical discipline within the Reformed Tradition renders any attempt to appropriate a Neo-Platonic understanding of beauty ineffectual.

The work of Dan Brock and Helga Kuhse is typical of the current stream of thought rejecting the validity of sanctity of life appeals to instill objective inviolable worth in human life regardless of the quality of life of the patient. The context of a person's life is supremely important. In their systems life can have high value, yet the value of life can be outweighed by the force of other disvalues. The notion of quality of life has increasingly come (...) to signify the measurement of the worth of a person's life itself. Having a life equals personal life. Any objectivity to life resides in 'personal', 'biographical', or 'creative' life, not mere biological life. Personal life represents the minimal threshold for any objective worth. In responding to this challenge, John Finnis has argued extensively that life is an intrinsic good – a basic human good. Following from our grasp of human life as a basic incommensurable good, it cannot be practically reasonable both to affirm that (a) 'human life is a basic human good', and (b) that 'human life qua human life can be intentionally acted against to its destruction'. Yet, if the good of human life can be considered self-evident, the self-evidence of the basic human good qua good does not mean that dialectical reasoning cannot be engaged in to indirectly support the practical reasonableness of respecting the good of human life in the deliberative choices that persons make concerning their actions. It is to the use of such dialectical reasoning, supportive of the status of human life as such a basic human good, that the article is primarily concerned to draw out and articulate. (shrink)

To live the risen life with God is, presumably, to be what we are meant to be. What can we conclude about our duties to the dying from the medieval belief that we join the hosts of heaven as “animated earth”?