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Problems of rationality.Donald Davidson (ed.) - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The nature of Buddhist ethics.Damien Keown - 1992 - New York: St. Martin's Press.details
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Needs, Values, Truth.David Wiggins - 1987 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 180 (1):106-106.details
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What are Mādhyamikas Refuting? Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla et alii on Superimpositions (samāropa).Tom Tillemans - 2004 - In Musashi Tachikawa, Shoun Hino & Toshihiro Wada (eds.), Three mountains and seven rivers: Prof. Musashi Tachikawa's felicitation volume. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. pp. 225--237.details
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Rationality.Charles Taylor - 1982 - In Martin Hollis & Steven Lukes (eds.), Rationality and relativism. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 87--105.details
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1. The Deceptive Self: Liars, Layers, and Lairs.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty - 1988 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 11-28.details
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(2 other versions)Personal identity and Buddhist philosophy: empty persons.Mark Siderits - 2003 - Burlington, VT: Ashgate.details
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The Nature of Buddhist Ethics.Damien Keown - 1994 - Religious Studies 30 (2):252-254.details
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Epistemic akrasia and epistemic virtue.Christopher Hookway - 2001 - In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue epistemology: essays on epistemic virtue and responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 178–199.details
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Who is Fooled.Donald Davidson - 2004 - In Problems of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Action and its explanation.Colin McGinn - 1979 - In Neil Bolton (ed.), Philosophical problems in psychology. New York: Methuen. pp. 20--42.details
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Mortal Questions.[author unknown] - 1979 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3):578-578.details
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