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  1. Real Time Ii.David Hugh Mellor - 1998 - New York: Routledge.
    _Real Time II_ extends and evolves DH Mellor's classic exploration of the philosophy of time,_Real Time._ This new book answers such basic metaphysical questions about time as: how do past, present and future differ, how are time and space related, what is change, is time travel possible? His _Real Time_ dominated the philosophy of time for fifteen years. _Real TIme II_ will do the same for the next twenty. GET /english/edu/Studying_at_SU/History_of_Literature.html HTTP/1.0.
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  • On presentism and triviality.Thomas M. Crisp - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:15-20.
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  • Causing and Nothingness.Helen Beebee - 2004 - In John Collins, Ned Hall & Laurie Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. MIT Press. pp. 291--308.
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  • (1 other version)Ontological realism.Theodore Sider - 2009 - In Ryan Wasserman, David Manley & David Chalmers (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 384--423.
    In , Peter van Inwagen asked a good question. (Asking the right question is often the hardest part.) He asked: what do you have to do to some objects to get them to compose something---to bring into existence some further thing made up of those objects? Glue them together or what?1 Some said that you don’t have to do anything.2 No matter what you do to the objects, they’ll always compose something further, no matter how they are arranged. Thus we (...)
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  • Presentism and properties.John Bigelow - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:35-52.
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  • (1 other version)Tense and reality.Kit Fine - 2005 - In Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 261--320.
    There is a common form of problem, to be found in many areas of philosophy, concerning the relationship between our perspective on reality and reality itself. We make statements (or form judgements) about how things are from a given standpoint or perspective. We make the statement ‘it is raining’ from the standpoint of the present time, for example, or the statement‘it is here’ from the standpoint of where we are, or the statement ‘I am glad’ from the standpoint of a (...)
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  • Presentism and eternalism in perspective.Steven Savitt - 2006 - In Dennis Dieks (ed.), The Ontology of Spacetime I. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
    The distinction between presentism and eternalism is usually sought in some formula like ‘Only presently existing things exist’ or ‘Past, present, and future events are equally real’. I argue that ambiguities in the copula prevent these slogans from distinguishing significant opposed positions. I suggest in addition that one can find a series of significant distinctions if one takes spacetime structure into account. These presentisms and eternalisms are not contradictory. They are complementary elements of a complete naturalistic philosophy of time.
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  • The irrelevance of the presentist/eternalist debate for the ontology of Minkowski spacetime.Mauro Dorato - 2006 - In Dennis Geert Bernardus Johan Dieks (ed.), The ontology of spacetime. Boston: Elsevier. pp. 93-109.
    In this paper I argue that the debate between the so-called “presentists” – according to whom only the present is real – and the “eternalists”, according to whom past present and future are equally real, has no ontological significance. In particular, once we carefully distinguish between a tensed and a tenseless sense of existence, it is difficult to find a single ontological claim on which the two parties could disagree. Since the choice of using a tense or a tenseless language (...)
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  • (1 other version)A Defense of Presentism.Ned Markosian - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:47-82.
    ∗ Apologies to Mark Hinchliff for stealing the title of his dissertation. (See Hinchliff, A Defense of Presentism. As it turns out, however, the version of Presentism defended here is different from the version defended by Hinchliff. See Section 3.1 below.).
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  • Presentism and the non-present.Matthew Davidson - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (1):77 - 92.
    In this paper I argue that presentism has a problem accounting forthe truth of statements whose truth conditions seem to require therebe relations that hold between present and non-present objects. Imotivate the problem and then examine several strategies for dealingwith the problem. I argue that no solution is forthcoming, and thispresents a prima facie problem for presentism.
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  • The metaphysics of a- and b-time.Clifford Williams - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (184):371-381.
    The traditional description of A- and B-time is that the former consists of a mind-independent past, present, and future, and that the latter consists solely of the time relations--earlier than, simultaneous with, and later than. Although this description makes it look as if there are two clearly contrasting concepts of time, it does not differentiate the passage of A-time from the succession in B-time. Nor does it explain what it means for events in B-time to be equally real and for (...)
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  • Presentism and ontological commitment.Theodore Sider - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (7):325-347.
    Presentism is the doctrine that only the present is real. Since ordinary talk and thought are full of quantification over non-present objects, presentists are in a familiar predicament: in their unreflective moments they apparently commit themselves to far more than their ontological scruples allow. A familiar response is to begin a project of paraphrase. Truths appearing to quantify over problematic entities are shown, on analysis, to not involve quantification over those entities after all. But I think that we might be (...)
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  • Presentism and the objection from being-supervenience.Brian Kierland & Bradley Monton - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):485-497.
    In this paper, we show that presentism -- the view that the way things are is the way things presently are -- is not undermined by the objection from being-supervenience. This objection claims, roughly, that presentism has trouble accounting for the truth-value of past-tense claims. Our demonstration amounts to the articulation and defence of a novel version of presentism. This is brute past presentism, according to which the truth-value of past-tense claims is determined by the past understood as a fundamental (...)
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  • (1 other version)A Defense of Presentism.Ned Markosian - 2004 - In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 1. Oxford University Press.
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  • Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers.Kit Fine - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    This book is collection of the the author’s previously published papers on the philosophy of modality and tense and it also includes three unpublished papers. The author provides an exposition and defence of certain positions for which he is well-known: the intelligibility of modality de re; the primitiveness of the modal; and the primacy of the actual over the possible. He also argues for some less familiar positions: the existence of distinctive forms of natural and normative necessity, not reducible to (...)
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  • Truthmakers, the past, and the future.Josh Parsons - 2005 - In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.
    I want to join Dummett in saying that the reality of the past (and, by analogy, the reality of the future) is an issue of realism versus anti-realism: (Dummett 1969) If you affirm the reality of the past, you are a realist about the past. If you deny the reality of the past, you are an anti-realist about the past. (And likewise, in each case, for the future). It makes sense to think of these issues by analogy with realism about (...)
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  • The Way Things Were.Ben Caplan & David Sanson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):24-39.
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  • On a new argument from actualism to serious actualism.Hud Hudson - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):520-524.
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  • Presentism and the grounding objection.Thomas M. Crisp - 2007 - Noûs 41 (1):90–109.
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  • The Tensed Theory of Time : A Critical Examination.William Lane Craig - 2000 - Kluwer Academic.
    In this book and the companion volume The Tenseless Theory of Time: A Critical Examination, Craig undertakes the first thorough appraisal of the arguments for and against the tensed and tenseless theories of time.
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  • Reply to Ludlow.Thomas Crisp - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:37-46.
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  • (2 other versions)Presentism and Truthmaking.Simon Keller - 2004 - In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 83-104.
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  • Quantifiers and temporal ontology.Theodore Sider - 2006 - Mind 115 (457):75-97.
    Eternalists say that non-present entities (for instance dinosaurs) exist; presentists say that they do not. But some sceptics deny that this debate is genuine, claiming that presentists simply represent eternalists' quantifiers over non-present entities in different notation. This scepticism may be refuted on purely logical grounds: one of the leading candidate ‘presentist quantifiers’ over non-present things has the inferential role of a quantifier. The dispute over whether non-present objects exist is as genuine and non-verbal as the dispute over whether there (...)
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  • (Serious) actualism and (serious) presentism.Michael Bergmann - 1999 - Noûs 33 (1):118-132.
    Actualism is the thesis that necessarily, everything that there is exists. Serious actualism is the thesis that necessarily, no object has a property in a world in which it does not exist. Let's call the claim that actualism entails serious actualism the Entailment Thesis (ET). In this paper I will improve upon a previous argument of mine for (ET). I will then consider the prospects for defending a similar thesis in the temporal realm—the thesis that presentism entails serious presentism.
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  • (1 other version)The Presentist’s Dilemma.Ulrich Meyer - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (3):213-225.
    This paper defends three theses: that presentism is either trivial or untenable; that the debate between tensed and tenseless theories of time is not about the status of presentism; and that there is no temporal analogue of the modal thesis of actualism.
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  • Presentism and truth-making.Jonathan Tallant - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (3):407-416.
    Here, I defend the view that there is no sensible way to pin a truth-maker objection on presentism. First, I suggest that if we adopt truth-maker maximalism then the presentist can requisition appropriate ontological resources with impunity. Second, if we deny maximalism, then the presentist can sensibly restrict the truth-maker principle in order to avoid the demand for truth-makers for talk about the non-present.
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  • Truth and ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Truth and Ontology concludes that some truths do not depend on being in any substantive way at all.
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  • A new argument from actualism to serious actualism.Michael Bergmann - 1996 - Noûs 30 (3):356-359.
    Actualism is the thesis that necessarily everything that there is exists. Serious actualism is the thesis that necessarily no object has a property in a world in which it does not exist. In this paper I present a new argument from actualism to serious actualism.
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  • Time and Realism: Metaphysical and Antimetaphysical Perspectives.Yuval Dolev - 2007 - MIT Press.
    Dolev's ambitious project is to show that the traditional debate in the philosophy of time between the so-called ‘tensed’ and ‘tenseless’ theorists is not a sustainable one. The key to the negative portion argument is that both the tensed and tenseless view of time can be understood only from within their respective ontological frameworks. Moreover, that there is only really an appearance of understanding within these frameworks, since neither framework furnishes us with the wherewithal to genuinely understand temporal language. Moving (...)
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  • Presentism, triviality, and the varieties of tensism.Peter Ludlow - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:21-36.
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  • (1 other version)Truthmaking for presentists.Ross P. Cameron - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 6:55-100.
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  • On the alleged incompatibility of presentism and temporal parts.Lawrence Brian Lombard - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (1-2):253-260.
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  • (1 other version)Truthmaking for Presentists.Ross P. Cameron - 2011 - In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 6. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
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