Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Defending Conventions as Functionally a Priori Knowledge.David J. Stump - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1149-1160.
    Recent defenses of a priori knowledge can be applied to the idea of conventions in science in order to indicate one important sense in which conventionalism is correctsome elements of physical theory have a unique epistemological status as a functionally a priori part of our physical theory. I will argue that the former a priori should be treated as empirical in a very abstract sense, but still conventional. Though actually coming closer to the Quinean position than recent defenses of a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Analyticity and Apriority: Beyond Wittgenstein and Quine.Hilary Putnam - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):423-441.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3770 citations  
  • Review Essay on Dynamics of Reason by Michael Friedman. [REVIEW]Marc Lange - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):702–712.
    The first half of this book consists of Michael Friedman’s Kant Lectures in essentially the form in which they were delivered at Stanford University in 1999. In the second half, “Fruits of Discussion,” Friedman elaborates, refines, and defends the central ideas of these lectures. Taken together, these halves form an eminently readable, slim, yet rich and ambitious volume. It proves our fullest account to date not only of Friedman’s neo-Kantian, historicized, dynamical conception of relativized a priori principles of mathematics and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • It Ain’T Necessarily So.Hilary Putnam - 1962 - Journal of Philosophy 59 (22):658-671.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   130 citations  
  • Dynamics of Reason.Michael Friedman - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):702-712.
    This book introduces a new approach to the issue of radical scientific revolutions, or "paradigm-shifts," given prominence in the work of Thomas Kuhn. The book articulates a dynamical and historicized version of the conception of scientific a priori principles first developed by the philosopher Immanuel Kant. This approach defends the Enlightenment ideal of scientific objectivity and universality while simultaneously doing justice to the revolutionary changes within the sciences that have since undermined Kant's original defense of this ideal. Through a modified (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   157 citations  
  • Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   911 citations  
  • Review Essay on Dynamics of Reason by Michael Friedman.Marc Lange - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):702-712.
    The first half of this book consists of Michael Friedman’s Kant Lectures in essentially the form in which they were delivered at Stanford University in 1999. In the second half, “Fruits of Discussion,” Friedman elaborates, refines, and defends the central ideas of these lectures. Taken together, these halves form an eminently readable, slim, yet rich and ambitious volume. It proves our fullest account to date not only of Friedman’s neo-Kantian, historicized, dynamical conception of relativized a priori principles of mathematics and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • A Role for Reason in Science.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2003 - Dialogue 42 (3):573-598.
    Michael Friedman’s Dynamics of Reason is a welcome contribution to the ongoing articulation of philosophical perspectives for understanding the sciences in the context of post-positivist philosophy of science. Two perspectives that have gained advocacy since the demise of the “received view” are Quinean naturalism and Kuhnian relativism. In his 1999 Stanford lectures, Friedman articulates and defends a neo-Kantian perspective for philosophy of science that opposes both of these perspectives. His proffered neo-Kantian perspective is presented within the context of the problem (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World.Wesley C. Salmon - 1984 - Princeton University Press.
    The philosophical theory of scientific explanation proposed here involves a radically new treatment of causality that accords with the pervasively statistical character of contemporary science. Wesley C. Salmon describes three fundamental conceptions of scientific explanation--the epistemic, modal, and ontic. He argues that the prevailing view is untenable and that the modal conception is scientifically out-dated. Significantly revising aspects of his earlier work, he defends a causal/mechanical theory that is a version of the ontic conception. Professor Salmon's theory furnishes a robust (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   951 citations  
  • Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers Vol. 3.Hilary Putnam - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   75 citations  
  • The Theory of Relativity and a Priori Knowledge.Hans Reichenbach - 1965 - Berkeley: University of California Press.
    The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge will hereafter be cited as "RAK. " The German edition is out of print. 2 H. Reichenbach, The Philosophy of ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   77 citations  
  • Words and Life.Hilary Putnam - 1994 - Harvard University Press.
    Hilary Putnam has been convinced for some time that the present situation in philosophy calls for revitalization and renewal; in this latest book he shows us ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   96 citations  
  • Reconsidering Logical Positivism.Michael Friedman - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this collection of essays one of the preeminent philosophers of science writing offers a reinterpretation of the enduring significance of logical positivism, the revolutionary philosophical movement centered around the Vienna Circle in the 1920s and 30s. Michael Friedman argues that the logical positivists were radicals not by presenting a new version of empiricism but rather by offering a new conception of a priori knowledge and its role in empirical knowledge. This collection will be mandatory reading for any philosopher or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   191 citations  
  • Dynamics of Reason: The 1999 Kant Lectures at Stanford University.Michael Friedman - 2001 - CSLI Publications.
    This book introduces a new approach to the issue of radical scientific revolutions, or "paradigm-shifts," given prominence in the work of Thomas Kuhn. The book articulates a dynamical and historicized version of the conception of scientific a priori principles first developed by the philosopher Immanuel Kant. This approach defends the Enlightenment ideal of scientific objectivity and universality while simultaneously doing justice to the revolutionary changes within the sciences that have since undermined Kant's original defense of this ideal. Through a modified (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   86 citations  
  • Rule-Following and Realism.Gary Ebbs - 1997 - Harvard University Press.
    Through detailed and trenchant criticism of standard interpretations of some of the key arguments in analytical philosophy over the last sixty years, this book ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Narrating the History of Reason Itself: Friedman, Kuhn, and a Constitutive a Priori for the Twenty-First Century.Alan W. Richardson - 2002 - Perspectives on Science 10 (3):253-274.
    : This essay explores some themes in use of a relativized Kantian a priori in the work of Thomas Kuhn and Michael Friedman. It teases out some shared and some divergent beliefs and attitudes in these two philosophers by comparing their characteristic questions and problems to the questions and problems that seem most appropriately to attend to an adequate understanding of games and their histories. It argues for a way forward within a relativized Kantian framework that is suggested but not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Philosophical Naturalism.Michael Friedman - 1997 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 71 (2):5 - 21.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
    Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truth which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1081 citations  
  • There is at Least One a Priori Truth.Hilary Putnam - 1978 - Erkenntnis 13 (1):153 - 170.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Mathematics, Matter and Method. Philosophical Papers.Hilary Putnam - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (1):151-155.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  • Reconsidering Kant, Friedman, Logical Positivism, and the Exact Sciences.Robert DiSalle - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (2):191-211.
    This essay considers the nature of conceptual frameworks in science, and suggests a reconsideration of the role played by philosophy in radical conceptual change. On Kuhn's view of conceptual conflict, the scientist's appeal to philosophical principles is an obvious symptom of incommensurability; philosophical preferences are merely “subjective factors” that play a part in the “necessarily circular” arguments that scientists offer for their own conceptual commitments. Recent work by Friedman has persuasively challenged this view, revealing the roles that philosophical concerns have (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • The Analytic and the Synthetic.Hilary Putnam - 1967 - Critica 1 (2):109-113.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   106 citations