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Group beliefs

Synthese 91 (3):285-318 (1992)

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  1. Belief and acceptance.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1989 - Mind 98 (391):367-389.
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  • Believing and affirming.Robert Audi - 1982 - Mind 91 (361):115-120.
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  • We-Intentions.Raimo Tuomela & Kaarlo Miller - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (3):367-389.
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  • Intentional single and joint action.Raimo Tuomela - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (3):235 - 262.
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  • Actions by collectives.Raimo Tuomela - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:471-496.
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  • A Theory of Social Action.Raimo Tuomela - 1988 - Noûs 22 (4):624-629.
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  • On Social Facts.Margaret Gilbert - 1989 - Routledge.
    This book offers original accounts of a number of central social phenomena, many of which have received little if any prior philosophical attention. These phenomena include social groups, group languages, acting together, collective belief, mutual recognition, and social convention. In the course of developing her analyses Gilbert discusses the work of Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, Max Weber, David Lewis, among others.
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  • Modelling collective belief.Margaret Gilbert - 1987 - Synthese 73 (1):185-204.
    What is it for a group to believe something? A summative account assumes that for a group to believe that p most members of the group must believe that p. Accounts of this type are commonly proposed in interpretation of everyday ascriptions of beliefs to groups. I argue that a nonsummative account corresponds better to our unexamined understanding of such ascriptions. In particular I propose what I refer to as the joint acceptance model of group belief. I argue that group (...)
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  • Can collectives have beliefs?Raimo Tuomela - 1990 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 49:454-72.
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