This article is a selective review of David Lewis's Counterfactuals, a challenging, provocative, absorbingly interesting attempt to analyze statements of the form “If it were the case that P, then it would be the case that Q.” I shall follow Lewis in calling these “counterfactuals,” and shall nearly follow him in abbreviating them to the form P→Q.Chapter 1, which is nearly a third of the whole, gives the analysis and proves that it endows counterfactuals with some properties which they evidently (...) do have. Chapter 2 presents some “alternative formulations” of the analysis—a logical jeu d'esprit which I shall not discuss except for the section about “cotenability.”. (shrink)

The author maintains that there is no special problem about the verification or analysis of counterfactual or unfulfilled conditional statements. there is no special problem about the verification or analysis of subjunctive conditionals. it exhausts the peculiar philosophical interest of these two classes of statement to explain why no philosopher ought to think them peculiarly interesting, and to explain why so many do. the author states that it should not be supposed that if he achieves his aim, all the difficulties (...) and disputes which have occurred in discussions supposed to be about counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals will be settled in his article. this is because many of these difficulties have arisen, not out of features peculiar to either of these classes of statement, but out of features common to all conditional statements. (staff). (shrink)

... V The Foundations of Mathematics Braithwaite VI Logical Studies von Wright VII A Treatise on Induction and Probability von Wright VIII An Examination of ...

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

If we overlook no consequences when we assess the act, and no relevant features when we generalize, can it matter whether we ask 'What would happen if everyone did the same?' instead of 'What would happen if this act were performed?'? David Lyons has argued that it cannot. Two examples are here articulated to show that it can. The first turns on the way consequences are identified and assessed and in particular on the treatment accorded 'threshold consequences'. The second example (...) turns on the way in which the 'social context' of the act (what others would be doing) is taken into account in the generalization. Also included is a formal theory of conditionals from which implications are drawn for utilitarianism and with which I attempt to dispel certain doubts concerning cases employed in my arguments. (shrink)

A somewhat fictionalized account of several interpretations of implication is presented together with comparisons between classical, modal, tense, and intuitionistic logics.

Counterfactuals is David Lewis' forceful presentation of and sustained argument for a particular view about propositions which express contrary to fact conditionals, including his famous defense of realism about possible worlds and his theory of laws of nature.

The author criticizes pear's use of the notion of material implication in his explanation of contrary-To-Fact conditionals. The author attempts to show that universal material implications "have no relevance to contrary-To-Fact conditionals." (staff).