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  1. Pragmatism, Phenomenalism, and Truth Talk.Robert Brandom - 1988 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):75-93.
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  • A Critique of Deflationism.Anil Gupta - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (1):57-81.
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  • A Critique of Deflationism.Anil Gupta - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (2):57-81.
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  • Minimalism and the Value of Truth.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):497 - 517.
    Minimalists generally see themselves as engaged in a descriptive project. They maintain that they can explain everything we want to say about truth without appealing to anything other than the T-schema, i.e., the idea that the proposition that p is true iff p. I argue that despite recent claims to the contrary, minimalists cannot explain one important belief many people have about truth, namely, that truth is good. If that is so, then minimalism, and possibly deflationism as a whole, must (...)
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  • Epistemicism and the Liar.Jamin Asay - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):679-699.
    One well known approach to the soritical paradoxes is epistemicism, the view that propositions involving vague notions have definite truth values, though it is impossible in principle to know what they are. Recently, Paul Horwich has extended this approach to the liar paradox, arguing that the liar proposition has a truth value, though it is impossible to know which one it is. The main virtue of the epistemicist approach is that it need not reject classical logic, and in particular the (...)
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  • Deflationary Truth and the Liar.Keith Simmons - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):455-488.
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  • Two Distinctions in Goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.
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  • Minimalism and the Value of Truth.By Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):497–517.
    Minimalists generally see themselves as engaged in a descriptive project. They maintain that they can explain everything we want to say about truth without appealing to anything other than the T-schema, i.e., the idea that the proposition that p is true iff p. I argue that despite recent claims to the contrary, minimalists cannot explain one important belief many people have about truth, namely, that truth is good. If that is so, then minimalism, and possibly deflationism as a whole, must (...)
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  • The Use of Force Against Deflationism: Assertion and Truth.Dorit Bar-On & Keith Simmons - 2007 - In Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. pp. 61--89.
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