Let psychologism be the doctrine that whether behavior is intelligent behavior depends on the character of the internal information processing that produces it. More specifically, I mean psychologism to involve the doctrine that two systems could have actual and potential behavior _typical_ of familiar intelligent beings, that the two systems could be exactly alike in their actual and potential behavior, and in their behavioral dispositions and capacities and counterfactual behavioral properties (i.e., what behaviors, behavioral dispositions, and behavioral capacities they would (...) have exhibited had their stimuli differed)--the two systems could be alike in all these ways, yet there could be a difference in the information processing that mediates their stimuli and responses that determines that one is not at all intelligent while the other is fully intelligent. (shrink)

The functionalist view of the nature of the mind is now widely accepted. Like behaviorism and physicalism, functionalism seeks to answer the question "What are mental states?" I shall be concerned with identity thesis formulations of functionalism. They say, for example, that pain is a functional state, just as identity thesis formulations of physicalism say that pain is a physical state.

Functionalism represents the most promising as well as the most severely criticized approach to the philosophy of mind. In this dissertation functionalism is defended as a theory of the propositional content of intentional states. The first chapter is a criticism of the competing theories of propositional content: anti-mentalism, instrumentalism, and nonfunctionalist materialism. Theories of the first two kinds are open to straightforward counterexamples. Theories of the third sort are open to counterexamples on the assumption that the distinction between physical and (...) functional properties is neither incoherent nor arbitrary. It is shown that the criticisms which have been advanced against this assumption do not succeed. ;The second chapter is an account of the notion of a partial state functional description and its place in a theory of content. The role of radical interpretation in a theory of content is discussed and a method of assigning content to the partial functional state is elaborated. ;The third chapter is a treatment of the distinction between occurrent and dispositional mental states. The distinction which is relevant to philosophy of mind is between states which are causally efficacious and those which are not. It is argued that the occurrent/dispositional distinction so construed is definable in terms of partial state functional descriptions and a definition is provided. ;The fourth chapter is an account of the instantiation relation between physical systems and abstract automata. Conventionalism with respect to instantiation is the thesis that any causal system which is sufficiently large will instantiate any functional description. Counterexamples are provided to the most extreme version of the conventionalist thesis. General arguments are provided that the strategies which a conventionalist might employ in defending a weaker version of the thesis will not succeed. The chapter concludes with a formulation of the instantiation relation. ;The fifth chapter reconciles functionalism as a kind of autonomous psychology with causal theories of the referential content of intentional states. It is argued that although functional states do not determine propositions, they determine a kind of semantic content which is relevant to psychological explanation. (shrink)