The Claims of Common Sense investigates the importance of ideas developed by Cambridge philosophers between the World Wars for the social sciences concerning common sense, vague concepts and ordinary language. John Coates examines the thought of Moore, Ramsey, Wittgenstein and Keynes, and traces their common drift away from early beliefs about the need for precise concepts and a canonical notation in analysis. He argues that Keynes borrowed from Wittgenstein and Ramsey their reappraisal of vague concepts, and developed the novel argument (...) that when analysing something as complex as social reality, theory might be simplified by using concepts which lack sharp boundaries. Coates then contrasts this conclusion with the view shared by two contemporary philosophical paradigms - formal semantics and Continental post-structuralism - that the vagueness of ordinary language inevitably leads to interpretive indeterminacy. Developing a link between Cambridge philosophy and work on complexity, vague predicates and fuzzy logic, he argues that Wittgenstein's and Keynes's ideas on the economy of ordinary language present a mediating route for the social sciences between these philosophical paradigms. (shrink)

Im vorliegenden Buch geht es um die methodologische und epistemologische Charakterisierung der Computersimulation. Zu diesem Zweck werden Computermodelle vor der Kontrastfolie mathematischer Modelle betrachtet. Eine Strategie der Mathematisierung zielt darauf ab, komplexe Ph nomene in idealisierter Form zu modellieren und so die Komplexit t zu reduzieren. Die Simulation markiert das Ende dieser Strategie: Die Modelle werden nun selbst komplex und erhalten eine partielle Autonomie. Insbesondere der Prozess der Simulationsmodellierung erf hrt gegen ber traditioneller mathematischer Modellierung eine Transformation. Als zentrale Merkmale (...) der Simulationsmodellierung werden anhand typischer Beispiele analysiert: Artifizialit t, Experimentieren, Visualisierung, Plastizit t und epistemische Opazit t. Erst aus der Verkn pfung dieser Merkmale resultiert ein philosophisch neuartiges Bild, das wiederum zum Diskurs um das Verh ltnis von Wissenschaft und Technik beitr gt. (shrink)

In this paper we present two case studies on inconsistencies in the social sciences. The first is devoted to sociologist George Caspar Homans and his exchange theory. We argue that his account of how he arrived at his theory is highly misleading, because it ignores the inconsistencies he had to cope with. In the second case study we analyse how John Maynard Keynes coped with the inconsistency between classical economic theory and real economic conditions in developing his path-breaking theory.