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  1. Why are there descriptive norms? Because we looked for them.Ryan Muldoon, Chiara Lisciandra & Stephan Hartmann - 2014 - Synthese 191 (18):4409-4429.
    In this work, we present a mathematical model for the emergence of descriptive norms, where the individual decision problem is formalized with the standard Bayesian belief revision machinery. Previous work on the emergence of descriptive norms has relied on heuristic modeling. In this paper we show that with a Bayesian model we can provide a more general picture of the emergence of norms, which helps to motivate the assumptions made in heuristic models. In our model, the priors formalize the belief (...)
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  • Justification, coercion, and the place of public reason.Chad Van Schoelandt - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1031-1050.
    Public reason accounts commonly claim that exercises of coercive political power must be justified by appeal to reasons accessible to all citizens. Such accounts are vulnerable to the objection that they cannot legitimate coercion to protect basic liberal rights against infringement by deeply illiberal people. This paper first elaborates the distinctive interpersonal conception of justification in public reason accounts in contrast to impersonal forms of justification. I then detail a core dissenter-based objection to public reason based on a worrisome example (...)
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  • Skepticism about moral responsibility.Gideon Rosen - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):295–313.
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  • (1 other version)Two concepts of rules.John Rawls - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (1):3-32.
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  • A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
    Previous edition, 1st, published in 1971.
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  • Shrieking sirens: Schemata, scripts, and social norms. How change occurs.Cristina Bicchieri & Peter McNally - 2018 - Social Philosophy and Policy 35 (1):23-53.
    :This essay investigates the relationships among scripts, schemata, and social norms. The authors examine how social norms are triggered by particular schemata and are grounded in scripts. Just as schemata are embedded in a network, so too are social norms, and they can be primed through spreading activation. Moreover, the expectations that allow a social norm’s existence are inherently grounded in particular scripts and schemata. Using interventions that have targeted gender norms, open defecation, female genital cutting, and other collective issues (...)
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  • In Defense of Transracialism.Rebecca Tuvel - 2017 - Hypatia 32 (2):263-278.
    Former NAACP chapter head Rachel Dolezal's attempted transition from the white to the black race occasioned heated controversy. Her story gained notoriety at the same time that Caitlyn Jenner graced the cover of Vanity Fair, signaling a growing acceptance of transgender identity. Yet criticisms of Dolezal for misrepresenting her birth race indicate a widespread social perception that it is neither possible nor acceptable to change one's race in the way it might be to change one's sex. Considerations that support transgenderism (...)
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  • (2 other versions)The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions.Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
    Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting: it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features. For instance, envy might be thought appropriate when one's rival has something good which one lacks. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is (...)
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  • The Development of Social Knowledge. Morality and Convention.S. J. Eggleston & Elliot Turiel - 1985 - British Journal of Educational Studies 33 (2):186.
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  • Precis – The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World.Gerald Gaus - 2013 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (1):8-13.
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  • (2 other versions)The Moralistic Fallacy.Daniel Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
    Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion is fitting: it accurately presents its object as having certain evaluative features. For instance, envy might be thought appropriate when one’s rival has something good which one lacks. But someone might grant that a circumstance has these features, yet deny that envy is appropriate, on the grounds that it is (...)
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  • Kinds of norms.Elizabeth O'Neill - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12416.
    This article provides an overview of recent, empirically supported categorization schemes that have been proposed to distinguish different kinds of norms. Amongst these are the moral–conventional distinction and divisions within moral norms such as those proposed by moral foundations theory. I identify several dimensions along which norms have been and could usefully be categorized. I discuss some of the most prominent norm categorization proposals and the aims of these existing categorization schemes. I propose that we take a pluralistic approach toward (...)
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  • Review of Gerald F. Gaus: Justificatory liberalism: an essay on epistemology and political theory[REVIEW]Christopher McMahon - 1997 - Ethics 107 (3):515-517.
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  • A Theory of the Good and the Right.Gilbert Harman - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 42 (1):119-139.
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  • Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.Michael McKenna - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (3):415.
    This is an excellent book. It is innovative in scope and carefully argued throughout. The book recasts the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists as a normative debate about the conditions under which it is fair to hold a person morally responsible. Wallace’s strategy is to explain moral agency by examining the stance of holding morally responsible. On Wallace’s account, moral agency does not require the ability to do otherwise; this would invite legitimate incompatibilist suspicions about free will and determinism. Rather, (...)
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  • On the Emergence of Descriptive Norms.Ryan Muldoon, Chiara Lisciandra, Cristina Bicchieri, Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger - 2014 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (1):3-22.
    A descriptive norm is a behavioral rule that individuals follow when their empirical expectations of others following the same rule are met. We aim to provide an account of the emergence of descriptive norms by first looking at a simple case, that of the standing ovation. We examine the structure of a standing ovation, and show it can be generalized to describe the emergence of a wide range of descriptive norms.
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  • Beyond Belief: Toward a Theory of the Reactive Attitudes.Elisa A. Hurley & Coleen Macnamara - 2010 - Philosophical Papers 39 (3):373-399.
    Most moral theorists agree that it is one thing to believe that someone has slighted you and another to resent her for the insult; one thing to believe that someone did you a favor and another to feel gratitude toward her for her kindness. While all of these ways of responding to another's conduct are forms of moral appraisal, the reactive attitudes are said to 'go beyond' beliefs in some way. We think this claim is adequately explained only when we (...)
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  • [Book review] the rational and the moral order, the social roots of reason and morality. [REVIEW]Kurt Baier - 1995 - Ethics 106 (3):633-636.
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