Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Inductive Risk, Epistemic Risk, and Overdiagnosis of Disease.Justin B. Biddle - 2016 - Perspectives on Science 24 (2):192-205.
    . Recent philosophers of science have not only revived the classical argument from inductive risk but extended it. I argue that some of the purported extensions do not fit cleanly within the schema of the original argument, and I discuss the problem of overdiagnosis of disease due to expanded disease definitions in order to show that there are some risks in the research process that are important and that very clearly fall outside of the domain of inductive risk. Finally, I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • Distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate values in climate modeling.Kristen Intemann - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):217-232.
    While it is widely acknowledged that science is not “free” of non-epistemic values, there is disagreement about the roles that values can appropriately play. Several have argued that non-epistemic values can play important roles in modeling decisions, particularly in addressing uncertainties ; Risbey 2007; Biddle and Winsberg 2010; Winsberg : 111-137, 2012); van der Sluijs 359-389, 2012). On the other hand, such values can lead to bias ; Bray ; Oreskes and Conway 2010). Thus, it is important to identify when (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   82 citations  
  • Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal.Heather Douglas - 2009 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
    Douglas proposes a new ideal in which values serve an essential function throughout scientific inquiry, but where the role values play is constrained at key points, protecting the integrity and objectivity of science.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   429 citations  
  • A new direction for science and values.Daniel J. Hicks - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3271-95.
    The controversy over the old ideal of “value-free science” has cooled significantly over the past decade. Many philosophers of science now agree that even ethical and political values may play a substantial role in all aspects of scientific inquiry. Consequently, in the last few years, work in science and values has become more specific: Which values may influence science, and in which ways? Or, how do we distinguish illegitimate from illegitimate kinds of influence? In this paper, I argue that this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   67 citations  
  • State of the field: Transient underdetermination and values in science.Justin Biddle - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):124-133.
    This paper examines the state of the field of “science and values”—particularly regarding the implications of the thesis of transient underdetermination for the ideal of value-free science, or what I call the “ideal of epistemic purity.” I do this by discussing some of the main arguments in the literature, both for and against the ideal. I examine a preliminary argument from transient underdetermination against the ideal of epistemic purity, and I discuss two different formulations of an objection to this argument—an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  • The Community of Science®.James R. Brown - 2008 - In Martin Carrier, Don Howard & Janet A. Kourany (eds.), The Challenge of the Social and the Pressure of Practice: Science and Values Revisited. University of Pittsburgh Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • Rejecting the Ideal of Value-Free Science.Heather Douglas - 2007 - In Harold Kincaid, John Dupre & Alison Wylie (eds.), Value-Free Science: Ideals and Illusions? New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 120--141.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry.Helen E. Longino - 1990 - Princeton University Press.
    This is an important book precisely because there is none other quite like it.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1100 citations  
  • Values in Science beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk.Matthew J. Brown - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):829-839.
    Proponents of the value ladenness of science rely primarily on arguments from underdetermination or inductive risk, which share the premise that we should only consider values where the evidence runs out or leaves uncertainty; they adopt a criterion of lexical priority of evidence over values. The motivation behind lexical priority is to avoid reaching conclusions on the basis of wishful thinking rather than good evidence. This is a real concern, however, that giving lexical priority to evidential considerations over values is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   102 citations  
  • Bioethics: a systematic approach.Bernard Gert - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Charles M. Culver & K. Danner Clouser.
    This book is the result of over 30 years of collaboration among its authors. It uses the systematic account of our common morality developed by one of its authors to provide a useful foundation for dealing with the moral problems and disputes that occur in the practice of medicine. The analyses of impartiality, rationality, and of morality as a public system not only explain why some bioethical questions, such as the moral acceptability of abortion, cannot be resolved, but also provide (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  • Science, truth, and democracy.Philip Kitcher - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Striving to boldly redirect the philosophy of science, this book by renowned philosopher Philip Kitcher examines the heated debate surrounding the role of science in shaping our lives. Kitcher explores the sharp divide between those who believe that the pursuit of scientific knowledge is always valuable and necessary--the purists--and those who believe that it invariably serves the interests of people in positions of power. In a daring turn, he rejects both perspectives, working out a more realistic image of the sciences--one (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   464 citations  
  • Inductive risk and values in science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
    Although epistemic values have become widely accepted as part of scientific reasoning, non-epistemic values have been largely relegated to the "external" parts of science (the selection of hypotheses, restrictions on methodologies, and the use of scientific technologies). I argue that because of inductive risk, or the risk of error, non-epistemic values are required in science wherever non-epistemic consequences of error should be considered. I use examples from dioxin studies to illustrate how non-epistemic consequences of error can and should be considered (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   371 citations  
  • Principles of Biomedical Ethics.Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Tom L. Beauchamp & James F. Childress - 1995 - Hastings Center Report 25 (4):37.
    Book reviewed in this article: Principles of Biomedical Ethics. By Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2267 citations  
  • The appeal to robustness in measurement practice.Alessandra Basso - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 65-66 (C):57-66.
    This paper distinguishes between two arguments based on measurement robustness and defends the epistemic value of robustness for the assessment of measurement reliability. I argue that the appeal to measurement robustness in the assessment of measurement is based on a different inferential pattern and is not exposed to the same objections as the no-coincidence argument which is commonly associated with the use of robustness to corroborate individual results. This investigation sheds light on the precise meaning of reliability that emerges from (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Bias and values in scientific research.Torsten Wilholt - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (1):92-101.
    When interests and preferences of researchers or their sponsors cause bias in experimental design, data interpretation or dissemination of research results, we normally think of it as an epistemic shortcoming. But as a result of the debate on science and values, the idea that all extra-scientific influences on research could be singled out and separated from pure science is now widely believed to be an illusion. I argue that nonetheless, there are cases in which research is rightfully regarded as epistemologically (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   125 citations  
  • How models are used to represent reality.Ronald N. Giere - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):742-752.
    Most recent philosophical thought about the scientific representation of the world has focused on dyadic relationships between language-like entities and the world, particularly the semantic relationships of reference and truth. Drawing inspiration from diverse sources, I argue that we should focus on the pragmatic activity of representing, so that the basic representational relationship has the form: Scientists use models to represent aspects of the world for specific purposes. Leaving aside the terms "law" and "theory," I distinguish principles, specific conditions, models, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   310 citations  
  • Nonepistemic Values and the Multiple Goals of Science.Kevin C. Elliott & Daniel J. McKaughan - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):1-21.
    Recent efforts to argue that nonepistemic values have a legitimate role to play in assessing scientific models, theories, and hypotheses typically either reject the distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic values or incorporate nonepistemic values only as a secondary consideration for resolving epistemic uncertainty. Given that scientific representations can legitimately be evaluated not only based on their fit with the world but also with respect to their fit with the needs of their users, we show in two case studies that nonepistemic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   108 citations  
  • (1 other version)Science as Social Knowledge.Sharon L. Crasnow - 1992 - Hypatia 8 (3):194-201.
    In Science as Social Knowledge, Helen Longino offers a contextual analysis of evidential relevance. She claims that this "contextual empiricism" reconciles the objectivity of science with the claim that science is socially constructed. I argue that while her account does offer key insights into the role that values play in science, her claim that science is nonetheless objective is problematic.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   160 citations  
  • Social values and scientific evidence: the case of the HPV vaccines.Kristen Intemann & Inmaculada Melo-martín - 2010 - Biology and Philosophy 25 (2):203-213.
    Several have argued that the aims of scientific research are not always independent of social and ethical values. Yet this is often assumed only to have implications for decisions about what is studied, or which research projects are funded, and not for methodological decisions or standards of evidence. Using the case of the recently developed HPV vaccines, we argue that the social aims of research can also play important roles in justifying decisions about (1) how research problems are defined in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Social values and scientific evidence: The case of the HPV vaccines.Kristen Intemann & Inmaculada de Melo-Martín - 2010 - Biology and Philosophy 25 (2):203-213.
    Several have argued that the aims of scientific research are not always independent of social and ethical values. Yet this is often assumed only to have implications for decisions about what is studied, or which research projects are funded, and not for methodological decisions or standards of evidence. Using the case of the recently developed HPV vaccines, we argue that the social aims of research can also play important roles in justifying decisions about (1) how research problems are defined in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Funding, objectivity and the socialization of medical research.James Robert Brown - 2002 - Science and Engineering Ethics 8 (3):295--308.
    There has been a sharp rise in private funding of medical research, especially in relation to patentable products. Several serious problems with this are described. A solution involving the elimination of patents and public funding administered through extended national health care systems is proposed.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Influence and prioritization of non-epistemic values in clinical trial designs: a study of Ebola ça Suffit trial.Joby Varghese - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 10):2393-2409.
    The recent Ebola virus disease outbreak in Western African countries has raised questions regarding the feasibility of adopting conventional trial designs such as randomized controlled trials for conducting experimental trials in the midst of a fatal epidemic. In the context of Ebola ça Suffit trial conducted in Guinea for testing the efficacy and effectiveness of rVSV–ZEBOV, a candidate vaccine, I argue that the trial design and the methodologies adopted for the trial have been rightly chosen for their ethical appropriateness and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Lessons from the vioxx debacle: What the privatization of science can teach us about social epistemology.Justin Biddle - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (1):21 – 39.
    Since the early 1980s, private, for-profit corporations have become increasingly involved in all aspects of scientific research, especially of biomedical research. In this essay, I argue that there are dangerous epistemic consequences of this trend, which should be more thoroughly examined by social epistemologists. In support of this claim, I discuss a recent episode of pharmaceutical research involving the painkiller Vioxx. I argue that the research on Vioxx was epistemically problematic and that the primary cause of these inadequacies was faulty (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  • Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective.B. C. van Fraassen - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):511-514.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   271 citations  
  • (3 other versions)Science, Truth, and Democracy.A. Bird - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):746-749.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   254 citations