Switch to: Citations

References in:

Reconsidering Scientific Threats to Free Will

In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology: Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Bradford. pp. 417-425 (2014)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Another Scientific Threat to Free Will?Alfred Mele - 2012 - The Monist 95 (3):422-440.
    In Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will (Mele 2009), I argue that scientists—neuroscientists and others—have not proved that free will is an illusion and have not produced powerful evidence for that claim. Manuel Vargas has suggested that in that book I ignore a serious scientific threat to free will (2009). The alleged threat is identified in section 1. It is the topic of this article.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Free Will and Substance Dualism: The Real Scientific Threat to Free Will?Alfred Mele - 2014 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 4. MIT Press.
    Mele uses survey methods of experimental philosophy to argue that folk notions of freedom and responsibility do not really require any dubious mind–body dualism. In his comment, Nadelhoffer questions Mele's interpretation of the experiments and adds contrary data of his own. Vargas then suggests that Mele overlooks yet another threat to free will—sourcehood. Mele replies by reinterpreting Nadelhoffer's data and rejecting Vargas’ claim that free will requires sourcehood.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations