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  1. Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible?D. M. Armstrong - 1963 - Philosophical Review 72 (4):417.
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  • The compleat autocerebroscopist: A thought-experiment on professor Feigl's mind-body identity thesis.Paul E. Meehl - 1966 - In Paul Feyerabend (ed.), Mind, matter, and method. Minneapolis,: University of Minnesota Press. pp. 184-248.
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  • Perception: And Our Knowledge of the External World.Don Locke - 1967 - Ny: Routledge.
    First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
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  • The mind-brain identity theory: a collection of papers.Clive Vernon Borst - 1970 - New York,: St Martin's P.. Edited by D. M. Armstrong.
    Mind body, not a pseudo-problem, by H. Feigl.--Is consciousness a brain process? by U. T. Place.--Sensations and brain processes, by J. J. C. Smart.--The nature of mind, by D. M. Armstrong.--Materialism as a scientific hypothesis, by U. T. Place.--Sensations and brain processes: a reply to J. J. C. Smart, by J. T. Stevenson.--Further remarks on sensations and brain processes, by J. J. C. Smart.--Smart on sensations, by K. Baier.--Brain processes and incorrigibility, by J. J. C. Smart.--Could mental states be brain (...)
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  • Incorrigibity and classification.John H. Chandler - 1970 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):101-6.
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  • Immediate awareness.Robert A. Imlay - 1969 - Dialogue 8 (2):228-42.
    The purpose of this paper is to show that we should dispense with the concept of immediate awareness, when it takes for its object the existence and nature of our sensations and images.The question of whether we are immediately aware of the existence and nature of our sensations and images cannot be answered in a reasonable manner unless we have a firm grip on the concept of immediate awareness. Philosophers who have employed it have usually employed it in such a (...)
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