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  1. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.Thomas Reid - 1785 - University Park, Pa.: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Derek R. Brookes & Knud Haakonssen.
    Thomas Reid was a philosopher who founded the Scottish school of 'common sense'. Much of Reid's work is a critique of his contemporary, David Hume, whose empiricism he rejects. In this work, written after Reid's appointment to a professorship at the university of Glasgow, and published in 1785, he turns his attention to ideas about perception, memory, conception, abstraction, judgement, reasoning and taste. He examines the work of his predecessors and contemporaries, arguing that 'when we find philosophers maintaining that there (...)
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  • Silencing the experience of change.Sebastian Watzl - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1009-1032.
    Perceptual illusions have often served as an important tool in the study of perceptual experience. In this paper I argue that a recently discovered set of visual illusions sheds new light on the nature of time consciousness. I suggest the study of these silencing illusions as a tool kit for any philosopher interested in the experience of time and show how to better understand time consciousness by combining detailed empirical investigations with a detailed philosophical analysis. In addition, and more specifically, (...)
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  • A statistical referential theory of content: Using information theory to account for misrepresentation.Marius Usher - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (3):331-334.
    A naturalistic scheme of primitive conceptual representations is proposed using the statistical measure of mutual information. It is argued that a concept represents, not the class of objects that caused its tokening, but the class of objects that is most likely to have caused it (had it been tokened), as specified by the statistical measure of mutual information. This solves the problem of misrepresentation which plagues causal accounts, by taking the representation relation to be determined via ordinal relationships between conditional (...)
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  • Towards a causal theory of linguistic representation.Dennis W. Stampe - 1977 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):42-63.
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  • Naturalizing the Mind.David Sosa & Fred Dretske - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (3):429.
    Aware that the representational thesis is more plausible for the attitudinal than for the phenomenal, Dretske courageously focuses on sensory experience, where progress in our philosophical understanding of the mental has lagged. His view, essentially, is that what makes any mental state what it is is not so much what it's like as what it's about.
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  • Signals.Brian Skyrms - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):489-500.
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  • SINBaD neurosemantics: A theory of mental representation.Dan Ryder - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):211-240.
    I present an account of mental representation based upon the ‘SINBAD’ theory of the cerebral cortex. If the SINBAD theory is correct, then networks of pyramidal cells in the cerebral cortex are appropriately described as representing, or more specifically, as modelling the world. I propose that SINBAD representation reveals the nature of the kind of mental representation found in human and animal minds, since the cortex is heavily implicated in these kinds of minds. Finally, I show how SINBAD neurosemantics can (...)
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  • An Appearance of Succession Requires a Succession of Appearances.Oliver Rashbrook - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):584-610.
    A familiar slogan in the literature on temporal experience is that ‘a succession of appearances, in and of itself, does not amount to an experience of succession’. I show that we can distinguish between a strong and a weak sense of this slogan. I diagnose the strong interpretation of the slogan as requiring the support of an assumption I call the ‘Seems→Seemed’ claim. I then show that commitment to this assumption comes at a price: if we accept it, we either (...)
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  • Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis.Jesse J. Prinz - 2002 - MIT Press.
    In Furnishing the Mind, Jesse Prinz attempts to swing the pendulum back toward empiricism.
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  • Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis.Andrew Woodfield - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):210-214.
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  • Perceiving temporal properties.Ian Phillips - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):176-202.
    Philosophers have long struggled to understand our perceptual experience of temporal properties such as succession, persistence and change. Indeed, strikingly, a number have felt compelled to deny that we enjoy such experience. Philosophical puzzlement arises as a consequence of assuming that, if one experiences succession or temporal structure at all, then one experiences it at a moment. The two leading types of theory of temporal awareness—specious present theories and memory theories—are best understood as attempts to explain how temporal awareness is (...)
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  • Experience of and in Time.Ian Phillips - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (2):131-144.
    How must experience of time be structured in time? In particular, does the following principle, which I will call inheritance, hold: for any temporal property apparently presented in perceptual experience, experience itself has that same temporal property. For instance, if I hear Paul McCartney singing ‘Hey Jude’, must my auditory experience of the ‘Hey’ itself precede my auditory experience of the ‘Jude’, or can the temporal order of these experiences come apart from the order the words are experienced as having? (...)
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  • Breaking the silence: motion silencing and experience of change.Ian Phillips - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):693-707.
    The naïve view of temporal experience (Phillips, in: Lloyd D, Arstila V (eds) Subjective time: the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of temporality, forthcoming-a) comprises two claims. First, that we are perceptually aware of temporal properties, such as succession and change. Second, that for any temporal property apparently presented in experience, our experience itself possesses that temporal property. In his paper ‘Silencing the experience of change’ (forthcoming), Watzl argues that this second naïve inheritance thesis faces a novel counter-example in the form (...)
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  • Pushmi-pullyu representations.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:185-200.
    A list of groceries, Professor Anscombe once suggested, might be used as a shopping list, telling what to buy, or it might be used as an inventory list, telling what has been bought (Anscombe 1957). If used as a shopping list, the world is supposed to conform to the representation: if the list does not match what is in the grocery bag, it is what is in the bag that is at fault. But if used as an inventory list, the (...)
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  • Neuropsychological mechanisms of interval timing behavior.Matthew S. Matell & Warren H. Meck - 2000 - Bioessays 22 (1):94-103.
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  • The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
    A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I point out that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories.
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  • Neural correlates of temporality: Default mode variability and temporal awareness.Dan Lloyd - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):695-703.
    The continual background awareness of duration is an essential structure of consciousness, conferring temporal extension to the many objects of awareness within the evanescent sensory present. Seeking the possible neural correlates of ubiquitous temporal awareness, this article reexamines fMRI data from off-task “default mode” periods in 25 healthy subjects studied by Grady et al. , 2005). “Brain reading” using support vector machines detected information specifying elapsed time, and further analysis specified distributed networks encoding implicit time. These networks fluctuate; none are (...)
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  • Dedicated and intrinsic models of time perception.Richard B. Ivry & John E. Schlerf - 2008 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (7):273-280.
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  • A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
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  • How to, and how n ot to, bridge computational cognitive neuroscience and Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness.Rick Grush - 2006 - Synthese 153 (3):417-450.
    A number of recent attempts to bridge Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness and contemporary tools and results from cognitive science or computational neuroscience are described and critiqued. An alternate proposal is outlined that lacks the weaknesses of existing accounts.
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  • Scalar expectancy theory and Weber's law in animal timing.John Gibbon - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (3):279-325.
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  • The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics.Jerry A. Fodor - 1994 - MIT Press.
    This book is largely a reconsideration of the arguments that are supposed to ground this consensus.
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  • The Elm and the Expert.Steven Horst - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):243-246.
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  • XI*—Introspection.Fred Dretske - 1994 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94 (1):263-278.
    Fred Dretske; XI*—Introspection, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 94, Issue 1, 1 June 1994, Pages 263–278, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/9.
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  • Knowledge and the flow of information.F. Dretske - 1989 - Trans/Form/Ação 12:133-139.
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  • Introspection.Fred Dretske - 19934 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:263-278.
    Fred Dretske; XI*—Introspection, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 94, Issue 1, 1 June 1994, Pages 263–278, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/9.
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  • The experience of time and change.Barry Dainton - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):619-638.
    Can we directly experience change? Although some philosophers have denied it, the phenomenological evidence is unambiguous: we can, and do. But how is this possible? What structures or features of consciousness render such experience possible? A variety of very different answers to this question have been proposed, answers which have very different implications for the nature of consciousness itself. In this brief survey no attempt is made to engage with the often complex (and sometimes obscure) literature on this topic. Instead, (...)
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  • Time-Perception Network and Default Mode Network Are Associated with Temporal Prediction in a Periodic Motion Task.Fabiana M. Carvalho, Khallil T. Chaim, Tiago A. Sanchez & Draulio B. de Araujo - 2016 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 10.
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  • Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - MIT Press.
    In this provocative book, Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of...
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  • Biosemantics.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (6):281--297.
    " Biosemantics " was the title of a paper on mental representation originally printed in The Journal of Philosophy in 1989. It contained a much abbreviated version of the work on mental representation in Language Thought and Other Biological Categories. There I had presented a naturalist theory of intentional signs generally, including linguistic representations, graphs, charts and diagrams, road sign symbols, animal communications, the "chemical signals" that regulate the function of glands, and so forth. But the term " biosemantics " (...)
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  • Biosemantics.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (July):281-97.
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  • The perception of time.C. Randy Gallistel - 1996 - In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.
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  • The puzzle of temporal experience.Sean D. Kelly - 2005 - In Andrew Brook (ed.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 208--238.
    There you are at the opera house. The soprano has just hit her high note – a glassshattering high C that fills the hall – and she holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds the note for such a long time that after a while a funny thing happens: you no longer seem only to hear it, the note as it is currently sounding, that glass-shattering high C that is loud and (...)
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  • Temporal Experience and the Temporal Structure of Experience.Geoffrey Lee - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    I assess a number of connected ideas about temporal experience that are introspectively plausible, but which I believe can be argued to be incorrect. These include the idea that temporal experiences are extended experiential processes, that they have an internal structure that in some way mirrors the structure of the apparent events they present, and the idea that time in experience is in some way represented by time itself. I explain how these ideas can be developed into more sharply defined (...)
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  • Biosemantics.Ruth Millikan - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
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  • On the temporal character of temporal experience, its scale non-invariance, and its small scale structure.Rick Grush - 2016
    The nature of temporal experience is typically explained in one of a small number of ways, most are versions of either retentionalism or extensionalism. After describing these, I make a distinction between two kinds of temporal character that could structure temporal experience: A-ish contents are those that present events as structured in past/present/future terms, and B-ish contents are those that present events as structured in earlier-than/later-than/simultaneous-with relations. There are a few exceptions, but most of the literature ignores this distinction, and (...)
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  • Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):528-537.
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  • Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.Thomas Reid & A. D. Woozley - 1942 - Philosophy 17 (66):189-190.
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  • Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.
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  • Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred I. Dretske - 1981 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 175 (1):69-70.
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  • Time and tense in perceptual experience.Christoph Hoerl - 2009 - Philosophers' Imprint 9:1-18.
    We can not just see, hear or feel how things are at a time, but we also have perceptual experiences as of things moving or changing. I argue that such temporal experiences have a content that is tenseless, i.e. best characterized in terms of notions such as 'before' and 'after' (rather than, say, 'past', 'present' and 'future'), and that such experiences are essentially of the nature of a process that takes up time, viz., the same time as the process that (...)
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  • Temporal Consciousness.Barry Dainton - unknown
    In ordinary conscious experience, consciousness of time seems to be ubiquitous. For example, we seem to be directly aware of change, movement, and succession across brief temporal intervals. How is this possible? Many different models of temporal consciousness have been proposed. Some philosophers have argued that consciousness is confined to a momentary interval and that we are not in fact directly aware of change. Others have argued that although consciousness itself is momentary, we are nevertheless conscious of change. Still others (...)
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  • Temporal Experiences and Their Parts.Philippe Chuard - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.
    The paper develops an objection to the extensional model of time consciousness—the view that temporally extended events or processes, and their temporal properties, can be directly perceived as such. Importantly, following James, advocates of the extensional model typically insist that whole experiences of temporal relations between non-simultaneous events are distinct from mere successions of their temporal parts. This means, presumably, that there ought to be some feature(s) differentiating the former from the latter. I try to show why the extensional models (...)
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  • Time, Passage and Immediate Experience.Barry Dainton - 2011 - In Craig Callender (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press. pp. 382.
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  • Brain Time and Phenomenological Time.Rick Grush - 2005 - In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 160.
    ... there are cases in which on the basis of a temporally extended content of consciousness a unitary apprehension takes place which is spread out over a temporal interval (the so-called specious present). ... That several successive tones yield a melody is possible only in this way, that the succession of psychical processes are united "forthwith" in a common structure.
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  • How languages construct time.Lera Boroditsky - 2011 - In Stanislas Dehaene & Elizabeth Brannon (eds.), Space, Time and Number in the Brain. Oxford University Press. pp. 333--341.
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