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  1. Features of similarity.Amos Tversky - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (4):327-352.
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  • Many reasons or just one: How response mode affects reasoning in the conjunction problem.Ralph Hertwig Valerie M. Chase - 1998 - Thinking and Reasoning 4 (4):319 – 352.
    Forty years of experimentation on class inclusion and its probabilistic relatives have led to inconsistent results and conclusions about human reasoning. Recent research on the conjunction "fallacy" recapitulates this history. In contrast to previous results, we found that a majority of participants adhere to class inclusion in the classic Linda problem. We outline a theoretical framework that attributes the contradictory results to differences in statistical sophistication and to differences in response mode-whether participants are asked for probability estimates or ranks-and propose (...)
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  • A different conjunction fallacy.Nicolao Bonini, Katya Tentori & Daniel Osherson - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):199–210.
    Because the conjunction pandq implies p, the value of a bet on pandq cannot exceed the value of a bet on p at the same stakes. We tested recognition of this principle in a betting paradigm that (a) discouraged misreading p as pandnotq, and (b) encouraged genuinely conjunctive reading of pandq. Frequent violations were nonetheless observed. The findings appear to discredit the idea that most people spontaneously integrate the logic of conjunction into their assessments of chance.
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  • The conjunction fallacy: a misunderstanding about conjunction?Daniel Osherson - 2004 - Cognitive Science 28 (3):467-477.
    It is easy to construct pairs of sentences X, Y that lead many people to ascribe higher probability to the conjunction X-and-Y than to the conjuncts X, Y. Whether an error is thereby committed depends on reasoners’ interpretation of the expressions “probability” and “and.” We report two experiments designed to clarify the normative status of typical responses to conjunction problems. © 2004 Cognitive Science Society, Inc. All rights reserved.
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  • Contingent weighting in judgment and choice.Amos Tversky, Shmuel Sattath & Paul Slovic - 1988 - Psychological Review 95 (3):371-384.
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  • Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1983 - Psychological Review 90 (4):293-315.
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  • The conjunction fallacy: a misunderstanding about conjunction?K. Tentori - 2004 - Cognitive Science 28 (3):467-477.
    It is easy to construct pairs of sentences X, Y that lead many people to ascribe higher probability to the conjunction X‐and‐Y than to the conjuncts X, Y. Whether an error is thereby committed depends on reasoners' interpretation of the expressions “probability” and “and.” We report two experiments designed to clarify the normative status of typical responses to conjunction problems.
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  • The empirical case for two systems of reasoning.Steven A. Sloman - 1996 - Psychological Bulletin 119 (1):3-22.
    Distinctions have been proposed between systems of reasoning for centuries. This article distills properties shared by many of these distinctions and characterizes the resulting systems in light of recent findings and theoretical developments. One system is associative because its computations reflect similarity structure and relations of temporal contiguity. The other is "rule based" because it operates on symbolic structures that have logical content and variables and because its computations have the properties that are normally assigned to rules. The systems serve (...)
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  • Another look at Linda.Wayne S. Messer & Richard A. Griggs - 1993 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 31 (3):193-196.
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  • On the reality of cognitive illusions.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (3):582-591.
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  • On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky.Gerd Gigerenzer - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (3):592-596.
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