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  1. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Frank Jackson champions the cause of conceptual analysis as central to philosophical inquiry. In recent years conceptual analysis has been undervalued and widely misunderstood, suggests Jackson. He argues that such analysis is mistakenly clouded in mystery, preventing a whole range of important questions from being productively addressed. He anchors his argument in discussions of specific philosophical issues, starting with the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism and moving on, via free will, meaning, personal identity, motion, and change, to ethics and the philosophy (...)
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  • Metaphysics Without Conceptual Analysis.Robert Stalnaker - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):631-636.
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  • Sellars vs. the given.Daniel Bonevac - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):1-30.
    John McDowell, Richard Rorty, and Robert Brandom invoke Sellars’s arguments against the Myth of the Given as having shown that the Given is nothing more than a myth. But most of Sellars’s arguments attack logical atomism, not the framework of givenness as such. Moreover, they do not succeed. At crucial points the arguments confuse the perspectives of a knower and those attributing knowledge to a knower. Only one argument-the “inconsistent triad” argument-addresses the Myth of the Given as such, and there (...)
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  • Sellars vs. the Given.Daniel Bonevac - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):1-30.
    John McDowell, Richard Rorty, and Robert Brandom invoke Sellars's arguments against the Myth of the Given as having shown that the Given is nothing more than a myth. But most of Sellars's arguments attack logical atomism, not the framework of givenness as such. Moreover, they do not succeed. At crucial points the arguments confuse the perspectives of a knower and those attributing knowledge to a knower. Only one argument—the “inconsistent triad” argument—addresses the Myth of the Given as such, and there (...)
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