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  1. Why Frequentists and Bayesians Need Each Other.Jon Williamson - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):293-318.
    The orthodox view in statistics has it that frequentism and Bayesianism are diametrically opposed—two totally incompatible takes on the problem of statistical inference. This paper argues to the contrary that the two approaches are complementary and need to mesh if probabilistic reasoning is to be carried out correctly.
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  • An objective Bayesian account of confirmation.Jon Williamson - 2011 - In Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao Gonzalo, Thomas Uebel, Stephan Hartmann & Marcel Weber (eds.), Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation. Springer. pp. 53--81.
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  • Set-based bayesianism.H. Kyburg & M. Pittarelli - 1996 - Ieee Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics A 26 (3):324--339.
    Problems for strict and convex Bayesianism are discussed. A set-based Bayesianism generalizing convex Bayesianism and intervalism is proposed. This approach abandons not only the strict Bayesian requirement of a unique real-valued probability function in any decision-making context but also the requirement of convexity for a set-based representation of uncertainty. Levi's E-admissibility decision criterion is retained and is shown to be applicable in the nonconvex case.
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