One of the central debates within contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy concerns how to formulate an egalitarian theory of distributive justice which gives coherent expression to egalitarian convictions and withstands the most powerful anti-egalitarian objections. This book brings together many of the key contributions to that debate by some of the world’s leading political philosophers: Richard Arneson, G.A. Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, John Rawls, T.M. Scanlon, and Larry Temkin.

The aim of this article is to refute Ronald Dworkin's claim that the provision of an equal opportunity to insure against risks is sufficient to render differences in people's circumstances that are the result of luck consistent with his theory of equality of resources. Section I addresses bad luck in the circumstances of individuals in the form of mental or physical incapacitation resulting from the vicissitudes of nature. Section II addresses bad luck which is the result of the choices of (...) other individuals to give or bequeath. (shrink)

This dissertation examines Ronald Dworkin's liberal theory of political morality. According to Dworkin, liberalism must be conceived as a species of egalitarianism. It provides an interpretation of what is held to be the most fundamental demand of political morality, namely that individuals be regarded as equal moral persons and as entitled consequently to equal concern and respect. I evaluate Dworkin's interpretation of egalitarianism, particularly as this exhibits itself in his theory of equality of resources which provides the framework for the (...) explanation and justification of liberal ideals of distributive justice, individual liberty and state neutrality. At the centre of this theory is the suggestion that the perfectly competitive market of economic theory has an indispensable role to play in the articulation of the constitutive elements of liberalism. Each chapter of my dissertation examines a different aspect of Dworkin's attempt to employ the market in solving central problems of liberal theory. I show that the concern with equality which ultimately animates liberalism is ill-served by sophisticated manipulations of the market model. (shrink)