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  1. Folk Psychology and Folk Morality: Response to Critics.Joshua Knobe - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):270-279.
    It is often implied, and sometimes explicitly asserted, that folk psychology is best understood as a kind of predictive device. The key contention of this widely held view is that people apply folk-psychological concepts because the application of these concepts enables them to predict future behavior. If we know what an agent believes, desires, intends, etc., we can make a pretty good guess about what he or she will do next. It seems to me that this picture is not quite (...)
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  • (1 other version)Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.
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  • Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language.J. Knobe - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):190-194.
    There has been a long-standing dispute in the philosophical literature about the conditions under which a behavior counts as 'intentional.' Much of the debate turns on questions about the use of certain words and phrases in ordinary language. The present paper investigates these questions empirically, using experimental techniques to investigate people's use of the relevant words and phrases. g.
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  • Intention, intentional action and moral considerations.J. Knobe - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):181-187.
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  • (1 other version)Intention.P. L. Heath - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281.
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  • (1 other version)Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.
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  • Intentional action and moral considerations: still pragmatic.F. Adams & A. Steadman - 2004 - Analysis 64 (3):268-276.
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  • Intentional action in ordinary language: core concept or pragmatic understanding?Fred Adams & Annie Steadman - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):173-181.
    Among philosophers, there are at least two prevalent views about the core concept of intentional action. View I (Adams 1986, 1997; McCann 1986) holds that an agent S intentionally does an action A only if S intends to do A. View II (Bratman 1987; Harman 1976; and Mele 1992) holds that there are cases where S intentionally does A without intending to do A, as long as doing A is foreseen and S is willing to accept A as a consequence (...)
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