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  1. Simulation without introspection or inference from me to you.Robert M. Gordon - 1995 - In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications - Reading in Mind and Language. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  • The Robot's Dilemma: The Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence.Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.) - 1987 - Ablex.
    Each of the chapters in this volume devotes considerable attention to defining and elaborating the notion of the frame problem-one of the hard problems of artificial intelligence. Not only do the chapters clarify the problems at hand, they shed light on the different approaches taken by those in artificial intelligence and by certain philosophers who have been concerned with related problems in their field. The book should therefore not be read merely as a discussion of the frame problem narrowly conceived, (...)
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  • Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press. Edited by Margaret A. Boden.
    Preface 1 Introduction: The Persistence of the Attitudes 2 Individualism and Supervenience 3 Meaning Holism 4 Meaning and the World Order Epilogue Creation Myth Appendix Why There Still Has to be a Language of Thought Notes References Author Index.
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  • Phenomenology of Perception.Aron Gurwitsch, M. Merleau-Ponty & Colin Smith - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (3):417.
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  • Co-cognition and off-line simulation: Two ways of understanding the simulation approach.Jane Heal - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (4):477-498.
    It is generally assumed that the debate between theory‐theory and simulation theory is an empirical one, but this view of the structure of the debate is misleading. It is an a priori truth that theory‐theory is mistaken and equally a priori that simulation in one sense (here labelled ‘co‐cognition’) is central in thinking about the thoughts of others. Given this, it is a further question how our co‐cognitive powers are realized in sub‐personal machinery. Here simulation in quite another sense (that (...)
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