This paper takes up again the perennial issue of the foundations of empirical knowledge. the general issue is seen to have three distinct though interrelated facets: those of "meaning", "justification", and "truth". first, how is it that our statements about the world acquire meaning; secondly, how is it that our beliefs about the world are justified; and thirdly, in what precisely consists the truth or falsity of the propositional content of our beliefs? answers to these questions are invariably interdependent, and (...) both classically and on the contemporary scene "the foundationalist" and "the coherentist" pictures of knowledge have been the dominant alternatives. after discussing each of these clear though stark views in some detail, i endeavor to construct and defend what i characterize as a mitigated foundational account of knowledge. (shrink)

A slightly expanded version of the De Carle Lectures delivered in 1964. The general program of this essay is to defend the autonomy of certain aspects of first person intentional discourse on the ground that they have a normative element and are thus irreplaceable by scientific explanations of human conduct and mental processes, whatever course these explanations may take. The first chapter distinguishes two kinds of possibility, one of which is human capability or power conceptually connected to the notion of (...) wanting or willing. The second chapter discusses the concept of desire. The third chapter distinguishes two kinds of knowledge, knowledge of the natural order justified by observation and inductive reasoning, and knowledge of my future actions whose source is intention or decision. This essay is clearer and more concise than the author's Thought and Action.—R. S. (shrink)