Die von Jens Timmermann besorgte Neuausgabe innerhalb der Philosophischen Bibliothek bietet den vollständigen Wortlaut der beiden Originalausgaben von 1781 und 1787. Der Kantische Text wurde unter Wahrung der Interpunktion und sprachlicher Eigenheiten sehr behutsam an die heutigen orthographischen Regeln angeglichen. Die semantisch bedeutenden Korrekturvorschläge späterer Herausgeber (nicht nur der Akademie-Ausgabe) sind, wo sie nicht in den Text Aufnahme gefunden haben, am Fuß der Seite verzeichnet. Alle wesentlichen Unterschiede zwischen den Originalausgaben sind durch Kursivdruck hervorgehoben, größere Abweichungen ganzer Textstücke - etwa (...) in der Einleitung und im Kapitel über Phaenomena und Noumena - wurden synoptisch gegenübergestellt, so daß Art und Umfang der Umarbeitung unmittelbar abgelesen werden können. Die durchgängig neu bearbeitete Studienausgabe folgt in den Grundprinzipien der seit 1926 in Forschung und Lehre maßgeblichen Ausgabe von Raymund Schmidt, die hiermit abgelöst wird. Sie wird ergänzt durch eine umfangreiche Bibliographie von Heiner Klemme sowie durch einen ausführlichen Personen- und Sachindex. (shrink)

This dissertation is a historical study of German scientists' agnostic epistemology in the 19th century in which their philosophical views are considered not merely intellectual propositions but also political and social rhetoric: as a strategy for legitimating, defending, entrenching, and promulgating both a view of science and a cultural worldview. Specifically, I have researched the background to, the debate upon, and the aftermath of the physiologist-physicist Emil du Bois-Reymond's 1872 proclamation of "absolute limits to science," as well as its connections (...) to the lives and work of his friend the physiologist-physicist Hermann von Helmholtz and his contemporary the pathologist-politician Rudolf Virchow. ;I argue that the rhetoric of epistemic limits these three scientists developed and expounded over the course of their careers was socially as well as intellectually influential because of its convenient ambiguity: seemingly modestly renouncing scientific judgement upon the metaphysical domain of the soul and the political sphere of authoritarianism when adverse cultural conditions threatened, while aggressively asserting scientists' prerogatives to speak upon the ethical issue of an empirical morality and the social issue of German secondary education when favorable political conditions warranted. This ambiguity served the "scientific agnostics" well in promoting and securing their professional careers as eminent academicians and officials, in establishing mechanistic German physiology, physics, and cellular pathology as modern institutionalized disciplines, and, from their resulting eminent positions as academic-officials, in influencing the course of German cultural history. ;I argue further that 19th century German "scientific agnosticism" illustrates the ineliminable presence of personal, disciplinary, and societal values in all philosophical discourse, and that to understand the mechanistic epistemology of limits to scientific knowledge culturally as well as intellectually is to recover an important part of the meaning of the predominant philosophy among 19th century German scientists. It is also an imperative to gaining a fuller, more informative account of the rise to preeminence of 19th century German science. (shrink)

In searching for the origins of current conceptions of science in the history of physics, one encounters a remarkable phenomenon. A typical view today is that theoretical knowledge-claims have only relativized validity. Historically, however, this thesis was supported by proponents of a conception of nature that today is far from typical, a mechanistic conception within which natural phenomena were to be explained by the action of mechanically moved matter. Two of these proponents, Hermann von Helmholtz and his pupil Heinrich Hertz, (...) contributed significantly to the modernization of the conception of science. Paradigmatic for their common contribution to this development is the way in which they employed the concept of image. By considering the origin and the different meanings of this concept we may trace a line of development which begins with Helmholtz's original claim that a universally and forever valid theory provides a unique representation of nature. It continues with the realization that the status of scientific knowledge is capable of revision; and it arrives at Hertz's admission that a variety of theories over a domain of objects is possible, at least at times. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to clarify why Ludwig Boltzmann from about 1895 to 1905 seemed to adopt a series of extreme epistemological positions, ranging from phenomenalism to pragmatism, while emphatically rejecting what he called ‘metaphysics’ (by which he meant all traditional philosophy). He concluded that all philosophical differences were merely linguistic and most were ultimately meaningless. But at about the time that young Ludwig Wittgenstein began absorbing these desperate ideas (1905), Boltzmann himself under the influence of Franz Brentano seemed (...) to assume a type of representationalism about the external physical world, while in his own mind adopting it for pragmatic reasons. Why? Because “it worked”. He seems to have defended his non-representationalist Bildtheorie on similar grounds, but his suicide followed shortly (1906). (shrink)

In recent years, the philosophy of Ludwig Boltzmann has become a point of interest within the field of history of philosophy of science. Attention has centred around Boltzmann’s philosophical considerations connected to his defense of atomism in physics. In analysing these considerations, several scholars have attributed a pragmatist stance to Boltzmann. In this paper, I want to argue that, whatever pragmatist traits may be found in Boltzmann’s diverse writings, his defense of atomism in physics can not be analysed this way. (...) In other words, I wish to show that he did not defend atomism as “preferable for its practical virtues”, as has been alleged.1 On the contrary, Boltzmann considered the atomist picture to be indispensable — more precisely, an indispensable prerequisite for making the application of continuous differential equations an understandable enterprise. (shrink)

Linear combinations of “elements of reality,” as defined by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, may not be themselves “elements of reality.” There are questions which can be formulated (and unambiguously answered) in the ordinary language of experimental physics, but cannot be represented in the mathematical framework of quantum theory in a nontrivial way.

Boltzmann’s Bildtheorie, which asserts that scientific theories are ‘mental pictures’ having at best a partial similarity to reality, was a core element of his philosophy of science. The aim of this article is to draw attention to a neglected aspect of it, namely its significance for the issue of scientific explanation and understanding, regarded by Boltzmann as central goals of science. I argue that, in addition to being an epistemological view of the interpretation of scientific theories Boltzmann’s Bildtheorie has implications (...) for the nature of scientific understanding. This aspect has as yet been ignored because discussion of the Bildtheorie has been restricted to the realism-instrumentalism debate. To elucidate my analysis of Boltzmann’s Bildtheorie concrete examples are presented, and the pragmatist and Darwinist roots of Boltzmann’s view are discussed.Moreover, I propose to use Boltzmann’s ideas as a starting-point for developing a novel analysis of the notion of scientific understanding, of which a brief impression is given. It shows that the study of Boltzmann’s philosophy is not only of historical interest but can be relevant also to modern philosophy of science and to the methodology of theoretical physics. (shrink)

Excerpt from Die Prinzipien der Mechanik in Neuem Zusammenhange Dargestellt Wahl eines Berufs entschliefsen mufste, wahlte er den des Ingenieurs. Es scheint, dafs die auch in spateren Jahren als ein charakteristischer Grundzug seines Wesens hervor tretende Bescheidenheit ihn an seiner Begabung fur theore tische Wissenschaft zweifeln liefs, und dafs er sich bei der Beschaftigung mit seinen geliebten mechanischen Arbeiten des Erfolges sicherer fuhlte, weil er deren Tragweite schon damals ausreichend verstand. Vielleicht hat ihn auch die in seiner Vaterstadt herrschende, mehr (...) dem Praktischen zugeneigte Sinnesweise beeinflufst. Ubrigens beobachtet man nicht selten diese Art zaghafter Bescheidenheit gerade bei jungen Leuten von hervorragenden Anlagen. Sie haben wohl eine deutliche Vorstellung von den Schwierigkeiten, die vor der Erreichung des ihnen vorschwebenden hohen Zieles zu uberwinden sind, und mussen ihre Krafte erst praktisch erprobt haben, ehe sie das zu ihrem schweren Werke notige Selbstvertrauen ge winnen. Aber auch in ihrer spateren Entwickelung pflegen reich veranlagte Naturen um so unzufriedener mit ihren eigenen Werken zu sein je hoher ihre Fahigkeiten und ihre Ideale reichen. Die Begabtesten erreichen offenbar nur des halb das Hochste, weil sie am empfindlichsten gegen jede Un vollkommenheit sind, und am unermudlichsten an deren Beseitigung arbeiten. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)