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  1. Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control.Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra & Jörg Rothe - 2009 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 55 (4):397-424.
    Electoral control refers to attempts by an election's organizer to influence the outcome by adding/deleting/partitioning voters or candidates. The important paper of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [1] that introduces control proposes computational complexity as a means of resisting control attempts: Look for election systems where the chair's task in seeking control is itself computationally infeasible.We introduce and study a method of combining two or more candidate-anonymous election schemes in such a way that the combined scheme possesses all the resistances to (...)
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  • Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games.Michael Zuckerman, Piotr Faliszewski, Yoram Bachrach & Edith Elkind - 2012 - Artificial Intelligence 180:1-19.
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  • Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative.Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra & Jörg Rothe - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence 171 (5-6):255-285.
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  • Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control.Gábor Erdélyi, Markus Nowak & Jörg Rothe - 2009 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 55 (4):425-443.
    We study sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV), a system proposed by Brams and Sanver [1] and here adjusted so as to coerce admissibility of the votes (rather than excluding inadmissible votes a priori), with respect to procedural control. In such control scenarios, an external agent seeks to change the outcome of an election via actions such as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. SP-AV combines the voters' preference rankings with their approvals of candidates, where in elections with at least two candidates (...)
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