In recent years geneticists have witnessed many significant observations which have seriously shaken the traditional concept of the gene. These specifically include the facts that (1) the boundaries of transcriptional units are far from clear; in fact, whole chromosomes if not the whole genome seem to be continuums of genetic transcription, (2) many examples of gene fusion are known, (3) likewise many examples of so-called encrypted genes are known in the organelle genomes of microbial eukaryotes and in prokaryotes, and (4) (...) in addition to the structure of the gene, its functional status can also be inheritable, and, further, (5) epigenetic extra-genomic modes of inheritance, called genetic restoration, seem to be a rather common phenomenon, meaning that organisms can sometimes rewrite their DNA on the basis of RNA messages inherited from generations past. I will briefly review these observations and discuss the difficulties of defining the gene, and then formulate a new view, which is called the relational or systemic concept of the gene. It has to be noted that genes assume their information content characteristics in the Shannonian sense as nucleotide sequences of DNA (or RNA). However, on the basis of this we cannot say anything about their information content in the semantic sense. The semantic information content of genes is context-dependent. Genes namely assume their biochemical characteristics usually only within living cells, their developmental characteristics only within living organisms, and their evolutionary characteristics only within populations of living organisms. (shrink)

We outline three very different concepts of the gene—instrumental, nominal, and postgenomic. The instrumental gene has a critical role in the construction and interpretation of experiments in which the relationship between genotype and phenotype is explored via hybridization between organisms or directly between nucleic acid molecules. It also plays an important theoretical role in the foundations of disciplines such as quantitative genetics and population genetics. The nominal gene is a critical practical tool, allowing stable communication between bioscientists in a wide (...) range of fields grounded in well-defined sequences of nucleotides, but this concept does not embody major theoretical insights into genome structure or function. The post-genomic gene embodies the continuing project of understanding how genome structure supports genome function, but with a deflationary picture of the gene as a structural unit. This final concept of the gene poses a significant challenge to conventional assumptions about the relationship between genome structure and function, and between genotype and phenotype. (shrink)

Many psychological scientists and behavioral neuroscientists affirm that “emotion” influences thinking, decision-making, actions, social relationships, well-being, and physical and mental health. Yet there is no consensus on a definition of the word “emotion,” and the present data suggest that it cannot be defined as a unitary concept. Theorists and researchers attribute quite different yet heuristic meanings to “emotion.” They show considerable agreement about emotion activation, functions, and regulation. The central goal of this article is to alert researchers, students, and other (...) consumers of “emotion” research to the multiple meanings or aspects that distinguished scientists attribute to ”emotion,” increase appreciation of its interesting and challenging complexity, and sharpen perspectives on “emotion” and the associated body of literature that is of critical significance to science and society. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary work addresses the question, "What role should psychological conceptualization play for thinkers who believe that the brain is the organ of the mind?" It offers readers something unique both by systematically comparing the writings of eliminativist philosophers of mind with the writings of the most committed proponents of biological psychiatry, and by critically scrutinizing their shared anti-anthropomorphism from the standpoint of a diagnostician and therapist. Contradicting the contemporary assumption that common sense psychology has already been proven futile, and (...) we are just waiting for an adequate scientifically-based replacement, this book provides explicit philosophical and psychological arguments showing why, if they did not already have both cognitive and psychodynamic psychologies, philosophers and scientists would have to invent them to better understand brains. (Series A). (shrink)