Conan, el niño del futuro (1978) es un dibujo animado oriental que plasma a una sociedad futurista que ha sobrevivido a la Tercera Guerra Mundial. El personaje principal, un niño de 10 años, aparece en la historia para impedir que el grupo hegemónico continúe con su pretensión de dominar el mundo, sin importar la tiranía que ejercen contra los ciudadanos. Para lograr ese vil propósito, las autoridades de Isla Industria han incurrido en escenarios en los que se observa la (...) esclavitud, la dificultad para expresarse con libertad y el sometimiento obligatorio a las decisiones del sistema. Esas actitudes no solo revelan un contexto recreado en un mundo ficcional, sino que es latente al apreciar las revueltas sociales de la actualidad. A ese tipo de manifestación por los derechos, se le agrega otra modalidad correlativa: la censura. Esta se concreta de forma implícita y sutil, con el objetivo de que las víctimas desacrediten sus derechos y no reclamen ante los abusos frecuentes de un gobierno que los sanciona, los encarcela o los exilia con injusticia. Su condición de peligro para la hegemonía es esencial, porque puede acarrear una toma de conciencia para los demás pobladores y una posible rebelión. Para finalizar, esta investigación se valdrá de las teorías poscoloniales e interculturales para evidenciar cómo un proyecto político se instaura en un anime japonés y, en especial, en el protagonista que desea reorientar a toda una sociedad, junto con ese sistema represivo inherente. (shrink)

On Goodness, by WolfsdorfDavid Conan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. xxii + 314.

There are things of which it is true to say that there are no such things. How can we resolve this paradox? Panayot Butchvarov argues that there are objects of reference that are not also entities, where the former must merely be thinkable but the latter must be indefinitely re-identifiable. This paper argues that fictional and many other unreal objects are indeed indefinitely re-identifiable, so they must be counted as existing things on Butchvarov's theory. The paradox is best resolved by (...) distinguishing among domains of existence: Sherlock Holmes exists in the unrestricted domain of objects and in the fictional domain created by Conan Doyle, but not in the domain of the real world. Thus to exist and to be real are different things; all objects exist in some domain, but only real objects really exist. (shrink)

In recent metaphysics, the questions of whether fictional entities exist, what their nature is, and how to explain truths of statements such as “Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street” and “Holmes was created by Arthur Conan Doyle” have been subject to much debate. The main aim of my thesis is to wrestle with key proponents of the abstractionist view that fictional entities are abstract objects that exist (van Inwagen 1977, 2018, Thomasson 1999 and Salmon 1998) as well as (...) Walton’s (1990) pretense view, which denies the existence of such entities. In the process, I propose modifications to these views to deal with problems they face and show how the modifications better account for the philosophical data. -/- Key abstractionists (van Inwagen 1977, Thomasson 1999) make a strict distinction between discourse within fiction, in which statements about literary characters cannot be literally true, and discourse about fiction, as it occurs in literary criticism, where statements about fictional characters can be literally true. Fictional objects are postulated to account for the truth of the latter. This runs into trouble because statements thought to be literally true are not literal. (Yagisawa 2001, Friend 2002) I provide a uniform analysis to account for the truth of statements involving fictional characters by appealing to a presupposition involving a metaphor in both contexts. The presupposition is that there is an x such that x is fictional; x is likened to a real person; and x is and ought to be treated/counted as a real person for all relevant intents and purposes. -/- More generally, I adopt Everett and Schroeder’s (2015) realist view that fictional characters are ideas constituted by mental representations. This, to me, better accounts for how fictional characters are created within the world’s causal nexus (unlike non-spatiotemporal entities in abstractionism), among other things. One key challenge they face is to explain how ideas can possess properties such as being a detective. I present a fine-grained version of their view, according to which the mental representations constituting fictional entities encode mind-dependent properties. Moreover, I explain how reference to such representations is possible, using Bencivenga’s (1983) Neo-Kantian view of reference and Karttunen’s (1976) view on discourse referents. Finally, I suggest that the identity of fictional characters is interest-relative. The constant, and sometimes radical, change of properties that, fictional characters can undergo is taken to be a consequence of the fact that unified mental representations are bundles of simpler mental representations. As change occurs, simpler representations are replaced by others. -/- A key theme that runs through the thesis is that neither fictionality nor pretense is relevant to the semantics of fictional sentences—a claim bolstered by Matravers’ (2014) arguments. Whether or not my account works, this claim, as well as the new philosophical data I bring up, are some of the challenges I pose to the heart of established views. (shrink)