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  1. Balancing Acts: Intending Good and Foreseeing Harm -- The Principle of Double Effect in the Law of Negligence.Edward C. Lyons - 2005 - Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy 3 (2):453-500.
    In this article, responding to assertions that the principle of double effect has no place in legal analysis, I explore the overlap between double effect and negligence analysis. In both, questions of culpability arise in situations where a person acts with no intent to cause harm but where reasonable foreseeability of unintended harm exists. Under both analyses, the determination of whether such conduct is permissible involves a reasonability test that balances that foreseeable harm against the good intended by the actor's (...)
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  2. In Incognito: The Principle of Double Effect in American Constitutional Law.Edward C. Lyons - 2005 - Florida Law Review 57 (3):469-563.
    Abstract: In Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), the Supreme Court for the first time in American case law explicitly applied the principle of double effect to reject an equal protection claim to physician-assisted suicide. Double effect, traced historically to Thomas Aquinas, proposes that under certain circumstances it is permissible unintentionally to cause foreseen evil effects that would not be permissible to cause intentionally. The court rejected the constitutional claim on the basis of a distinction marked out by the (...)
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  3. Reason's Freedom and the Dialectic of Ordered Liberty.Edward C. Lyons - 2007 - Cleveland State Law Review 55 (2):157-232.
    The project of “public reason” claims to offer an epistemological resolution to the civic dilemma created by the clash of incompatible options for the rational exercise of freedom adopted by citizens in a diverse community. The present Article proposes, via consideration of a contrast between two classical accounts of dialectical reasoning, that the employment of “public reason,” in substantive due process analysis, is unworkable in theory and contrary to more reflective Supreme Court precedent. Although logical commonalities might be available to (...)
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  4. All the Freedom You Can Want: The Purported Collapse of the Problem of Free Will.Edward C. Lyons - 2007 - St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary 22 (1):101-164.
    Reflections on free choice and determinism constitute a recurring, if rarified, sphere of legal reasoning. Controversy, of course, swirls around the perennially vexing question of the propriety of punishing human persons for conduct that they are unable to avoid. Drawing upon conditions similar, if not identical, to those traditionally associated with attribution of moral fault, persons subject to such necessitating causal constraints generally are not considered responsible in the requisite sense for their conduct; and, thus, they are not held culpable (...)
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