5 found
Order:
See also
Erik Wielenberg
DePauw University
  1. In Defense of Non-Natural, Non-Theistic Moral Realism.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2009 - Faith and Philosophy 26 (1):23-41.
    Many believe that objective morality requires a theistic foundation. I maintain that there are sui generis objective ethical facts that do not reduce to natural or supernatural facts. On my view, objective morality does not require an external foundation of any kind. After explaining my view, I defend it against a variety of objections posed by William Wainwright, William Lane Craig, and J. P. Moreland.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  2. Omnipotence Again.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (1):26-47.
    One of the cornerstones of western theology is the doctrine of divine omnipotence. God is traditionally conceived of as an omnipotent or all-powerful being. However, satisfactory analyses of omnipotence are notoriously elusive. In this paper, I first consider some simple attempts to analyze omnipotence, showing how each fails. I then consider two more sophisticated accounts of omnipotence. The first of these is presented by Edward Wierenga; the second by Thomas Flint and Alfred Freddoso. I argue that both of these accounts (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  3. Difference-Making and Easy Knowledge: Reply to Comesaña and Sartorio.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (1):141-146.
    Juan Comesaña and Carolina Sartorio have recently proposed a diagnosis of what goes wrong in apparently illegitimate cases of ‘bootstrapping’ one’s way toexcessively easy knowledge. They argue that in such cases the bootstrapper bases at least one of her beliefs on evidence that does not evidentially support the proposition believed. I explicate the principle that underlies Comesaña and Sartorio’s diagnosis of such cases and show that their account of what goes wrong in such cases is mistaken.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4.  77
    An Inconsistency in Craig’s Defence of the Moral Argument.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (4):49--58.
    I argue that William Craig’s defence of the moral argument is internally inconsistent. In the course of defending the moral argument, Craig criticizes non-theistic moral realism on the grounds that it posits the existence of certain logically necessary connections but fails to provide an adequate account of why such connections hold. Another component of Craig’s defence of the moral argument is an endorsement of a particular version of the divine command theory. Craig’s version of DCT posits certain logically necessary connections (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  68
    Mark Murphy. God and Moral Law: On the Theistic Explanation of Morality. Oxford University Press, 2011.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (1):199--203.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark