Los Alephs de Borges se distinguen de los Alefs de Cantor. ¿Qué son aparte de infinitud? ¿Dónde viven? ¿Qué hacen? Este escrito es una invitación a la imaginación ante la dialéctica entre la Teoría de Conjuntos cantarina y la Poesía Múltiple borgesiana. Enfrentaremos entonces lo profundo, el corazón, la invención en esos dos autores, revisando en particular ideas de densidad, asintoticidad, fractalidad. Nuestro pensamiento se expande a partir de la Teoría de Conjuntos, pero solo Borges puede distorsionar algo tan sublime, (...) con sus deformaciones del espacio, del tiempo, de lo real, donde inventa más infinitos de los que podemos imaginar. Estudiaremos cómo, en la matemática y en la literatura, la expansión de la imaginación es fundamental para crear, descubrir, ligar pensamientos y llegar a lo más verdadero y profundo. (shrink)

The paper depicts the blueprint of an electronic wise indicating system for demonstrating learning French to understudies to overcome the inconveniences they go up against. The fundamental idea of this structure is a proficient introduction into learning French. The system shows the purpose of learning French and coordinates thusly made issues for the understudies to clarify. The system is logically balanced at run time to the understudy’s individual progress. The system gives unequivocal help to adaptable presentation to learners.

Abstract: The paper depicts the blueprint of an electronic wise indicating system for demonstrating learning French to understudies to overcome the inconveniences they go up against. The fundamental idea of this structure is a proficient introduction into learning French. The system shows the purpose of learning French and coordinates thusly made issues for the understudies to clarify. The system is logically balanced at run time to the understudy’s individual progress. The system gives unequivocal help to adaptable presentation to learners.

This paper argues (i) that the possibility of experiencing at once pleasures and unpleasures does not threaten the contrariety of pleasure and unpleasure. (ii) That the hedonic balance calculated by adding all pleasures and displeasures of a subject at a time yields an abstract result that does not correspond to any new psychological reality. There are no resultant feelings. (iii) That there are nevertheless, in some cases, sentimental fusions: when the co-occurent pleasures and unpleasures do not have any bodily location, (...) and that their intentional object vanishes, they truly fuse with each other, giving rise to sentimental mixtures in which the initial pleasures and unpleasures are no longer discernible. (shrink)

Alfred Tarski (1901--1983) is widely regarded as one of the two giants of twentieth-century logic and also as one of the four greatest logicians of all time (Aristotle, Frege and Gödel being the other three). Of the four, Tarski was the most prolific as a logician. The four volumes of his collected papers, which exclude most of his 19 monographs, span over 2500 pages. Aristotle's writings are comparable in volume, but most of the Aristotelian corpus is not about logic, whereas (...) virtually everything written by Tarski concerns logic more or less directly. There is no doubt that Tarski wrote more on logic than any other author; he started publishing on logic in 1921 at the age of 20 and continued until his death at the age of 82. Two of his works appeared posthumously [Hist. Philos. Logic 7 (1986), no. 2, 143--154; MR0868748 (88b:03010); Tarski and Givant, A formalization of set theory without variables, Amer. Math. Soc., Providence, RI, 1987; MR0920815 (89g:03012)]. Tarski's voluminous writings were widely scattered in numerous journals, some quite rare. It has been extremely difficult to study the development of Tarski's thought and to trace the interconnections and interdependence of his various papers. Thanks to the present collection all this has changed, and it is likely that the increased accessibility of Tarski's papers will have the effect of increasing Tarski's already enormous influence. (shrink)

La position résolument extensionaliste de Quine a été appuyée par des arguments de nature différente, dans ses multiples articles destinés à rejeter le projet de logique modale. On peut classer ces arguments en trois catégories : un argument naturaliste, où l’auteur tente de baser le langage scientifique sur une notation tâchée de décrire la “structure ultime de la réalité” ; un argument esthétique, où Quine fait allusion à des raisons de clarté et d’efficacité démonstrative pour privilégier la théorie des fonctions (...) de vérité ; un argument pratique, dans la mesure où Quine défend la logique classique sur la base du “principe de mutilation minimum”. A travers une étude de ses écrits relatifs aux attitudes propositionnelles, nous montrerons que la philosophie de la logique de Quine a prolongé la partie épistémologique de son oeuvre, optant finalement pour une stratégie de réduction naturaliste des intensions, à l’image du mouvement engagé par Word and Object et prolongé par From Stimulus to Science. Ce projet se soldera par un échec relatif, et Quine résumera cette désillusion par un fossé entre les structures du langage et du monde : la thèse du “monisme anomal” de Davidson sera le dernier mot, amer, du défenseur acharné de la logique classique. (shrink)

It is widely held that some properties are more natural than others and that, as David Lewis put it, “an adequate theory of properties is one that recognises an objective difference between natural and unnatural properties” (Lewis 1983, p. 347). The general line of thought is that such ‘elitism’ about properties is justified as it can give simple and elegant solutions to a number of old metaphysical and philosophical problems. My aim is to analyze what these natural properties are: super-determinates (...) or determinable (or maybe both) and argue that all three of these options would lead to serious difficulties for metaphysical elitism and would prevent natural properties from fulfilling their supposed grand explanatory role. (shrink)