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Gabrielle Jackson
State University of New York, Stony Brook
  1.  33
    Gilbert Ryle’s Adverbialism.Gabrielle Benette Jackson - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-18.
    Gilbert Ryle famously wrote that practical knowledge (knowing how) is distinct from propositional knowledge (knowing that). This claim continues to have broad philosophical appeal, and yet there are many unsettled questions surrounding Ryle’s basic proposal. In this article, I return to his original work in order to perform some intellectual archeology. I offer an interpretation of Ryle’s concept of action that I call ‘adverbialism’. Actions are constituted by bodily behaviours performed in a certain mode, style or manner. I present various (...)
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  2.  48
    Skillful Action in Peripersonal Space.Gabrielle Benette Jackson - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):313-334.
    In this article, I link the empirical hypothesis that neural representations of sensory stimulation near the body involve a unique motor component to the idea that the perceptual field is structured by skillful bodily activity. The neurophenomenological view that emerges is illuminating in its own right, though it may also have practical consequences. I argue that recent experiments attempting to alter the scope of these near space sensorimotor representations are actually equivocal in what they show. I propose resolving this ambiguity (...)
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  3.  54
    Seeing What is Not Seen.Gabrielle Benette Jackson - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):503-519.
    This paper connects ideas from twentieth century Gestalt psychology, experiments in vision science, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. I propose that when we engage in simple sensorimotor tasks whose successful completion is open, our behavior may be motivated by practical perceptual awareness alone, responding to invariant features of the perceptual field that are invisible to other forms of perceptual awareness. On this view, we see more than we think we see, as evidenced by our skillful bodily behavior.
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  4.  31
    Maurice Merleau‐Ponty's Concept of Motor Intentionality: Unifying Two Kinds of Bodily Agency.Gabrielle Benette Jackson - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):763-779.
    I develop an interpretation of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of motor intentionality, one that emerges out of a reading of his presentation of a now classic case study in neuropathology—patient Johann Schneider—in Phenomenology of Perception. I begin with Merleau-Ponty's prescriptions for how we should use the pathological as a guide to the normal, a method I call triangulation. I then turn to his presentation of Schneider's unusual case. I argue that we should treat all of Schneider's behaviors as pathological, not only (...)
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  5.  18
    Starting with Merleau-Ponty, by Katherine J. Morris. New York: Continuum, 2012. 216 Pp. ISBN 978-1-84706-281-9 $24. [REVIEW]Gabrielle Benette Jackson - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (S3):e8-e12.
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