This paper presents the teaching of Isocrates (436-338 BC), Plato’s contemporary Athenian author, and his conceptions about the form and purposes of paideia or education, which he called, as a whole, philosophía. To this end, the list of students Isocrates supposedly had, the popularity of his school and the testimony by other authors of antiquity on his educational influence are described. After that, the isocratic definition of philosophía is discussed: sometimes presented as an intellectual commitment coupled with experience, at other (...) times as the culture or paideia created by Athens, a city where logos, in its double meaning of reason and discourse, occupied a place of exceptional importance. Finally, I move from this general definition of philosophía to that presented and professed by Isocrates in his school, which, according to him, was the only one to fully deserve the title of philosophía, defined as a deliberate educational procedure. Then the philosophía of Isocrates and its most important principles are presented: dóxa or opinion, empeíria or experience, and the kairós or occasion, pointing out the reasons for this option, the expected results of such educational program, and how such principles appear in what we would call its pedagogical methods, among which Isócrates’ practice of submitting his own works to the criticism of his students, in a form of discussion or debate that nowadays we would call a seminar, stands out. ********** O artigo apresenta o magistério de Isócrates (436-338 a.C.), autor ateniense contemporâneo de Platão, e suas concepções acerca da forma e dos propósitos da paideía ou educação, que ele denominava, em seu conjunto, philosophía. Para tanto, descrevemse o rol dos alunos que Isócrates teria tido, a popularidade de sua escola e o testemunho, por outros autores da Antiguidade, de sua influência educativa. Em seguida, discute-se a definição isocrática de philosophía, apresentada, por vezes, como um empenho intelectual conjugado à experiência; em outros momentos, como a cultura ou paideía criada por Atenas, cidade em que o lógos, em seu duplo sentido de razão e discurso, ocupava lugar de excepcional importância. Por fim, passa-se dessa definição geral de philosophía para aquela que a apresenta como um procedimento educativo deliberado, sendo que o professado por Isócrates em sua escola seria, segundo ele, o único a merecer, de todo direito, o título de philosophía. Descreve-se, então, a philosophía de Isócrates, com seus princípios mais importantes, a dóxa, ou opinião; a empeiría, ou experiência, e o kairós, ou ocasião, indicando as justificativas para essa opção e os resultados esperados de tal programa educativo, e de que modo tais princípios estariam presentes no que chamaríamos de seus métodos pedagógicos, dos quais se destaca a prática de Isócrates de submeter suas próprias obras à crítica de seus alunos, em um formato de discussão ou debate próximo do que denominaríamos, hoje, de seminário. (shrink)

In fragments of the lost Protrepticus, preserved in Iamblichus, Aristotle responds to Isocrates’ worries about the excessive demandingness of theoretical philosophy. Contrary to Isocrates, Aristotle holds that such philosophy is generally feasible for human beings. In defense of this claim, Aristotle offers the progress argument, which appeals to early Greek philosophers’ rapid success in attaining exact understanding. In this paper, I explore and evaluate this argument. After making clarificatory exegetical points, I examine the argument’s premises in light of pressing worries (...) that the argument reasonably faces in its immediate intellectual context, the dispute between Isocrates and Aristotle. I also relate the argument to modern concerns about philosophical progress. I contend that the argument withstands these worries, and thereby constitutes a reasonable Aristotelian response to the Isocratean challenge. (shrink)

Resenha do livro: MUNÕZ, Yolanda GG Nietzsche. Isócrates e Nietzsche: uma relação perigosa?. São Paulo: Paulus Editora, 2019. 211p.

This paper explores in detail Gorgias' defense of rhetoric in Plato 's Gorgias, noting its connections to earlier and later texts such as Aristophanes' Clouds, Gorgias' Helen, Isocrates' Nicocles and Antidosis, and Aristotle's Rhetoric. The defense as Plato presents it is transparently inadequate; it reveals a deep inconsistency in Gorgias' conception of rhetoric and functions as a satirical precursor to his refutation by Socrates. Yet Gorgias' defense is appropriated, in a streamlined form, by later defenders of rhetoric such as Isocrates (...) and Aristotle. They present it as an effective reductio against a critique of rhetoric that depends on the "harm criterion." This is puzzling, since Plato 's own critique of rhetoric does not depend on the harm criterion. On the other hand, Plato does seem to embrace the harm criterion as a more general principle—as if pre-emptively embracing the reductio —in his arguments about the good in the Meno and Euthydemus. Nonetheless, Isocrates and Aristotle seem to be deliberately misreading Plato on rhetoric: where he intends to criticize its intrinsic nature, they respond as if he were merely complaining about its contingent effects. (shrink)

This contribution gives an overview of the few passages of Ancient Greek literature dealing with the causes of epidemics and contagions (i.e. in Hippocrates, Thucydides, Isocrates, ps-Aristotle’s Problems, Plutarch, and Galen). With the help of the distinction between an ontological and a physiological conception of what a disease is, I suggest that the latter was an obstacle to better understand the process through which epidemics spread. I nonetheless show that the ontological conception of these diseases was not entirely absent from (...) Antiquity, as it is shown by Galen, who offers an etiological explanation of the origin of epidemics that combines both conceptions, the ontological and the physiological one. (shrink)

In the article, the author asserts that the transition of world history from Ancient Greece to the Middle Ages is connected precisely with the changed understanding and evaluation of the fundamental meanings of Being, but not with their replacement. The ancient paideia with all its achievements and peculiarities did not disappear in the history of culture. It transformed into the “paideia of Christ,” in which the second birth took place. After reviving in the new socio-cultural reality, Greek paideia retained its (...) fundamental meanings, which continued to be expounded through the conceptual apparatus of Christian theology in the theories of education in the Middle Ages. (shrink)

This paper has three major aims. The first is to defend the hypothesis that Aristotle’s lost work Protrepticus was a dialogue. The second is to explore the genres of ancient apotreptics, speeches that argue against doing philosophy and show the need for protreptic responses; our exploration is guided by Aristotle’s own analysis of apotreptics as well as protreptics in his Rhetorica. The third aim is to restore to the evidence base of Aristotle’s Protrepticus an apotreptic speech that argues against doing (...) Academic philosophy, evidence that was incorrectly excluded by Ingemar Düring in 1961. (shrink)